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BOUND IN SHALLOWS AND MISERIES: THE 1983
AMENDMENTS TO THE WORKERS' COMPENSATION
STATUTE*
H. Alston Johnson**
The philosopher Thomas Hobbes is credited with the gloomy obser-
vation that life could be described as "poore, nasty, brutish and short." '
One is tempted to make the same observation with respect to the life
expectancy of the celebrated Act 1 of the First Extraordinary Session of
1983, and the very substantial changes wrought in the workers' compen-
sation statutes by its provisions. The Act's extreme stance may have
shortened its lifespan drastically. The delicate balance or compromise in-
herent in the Act between the interests of the employer and the employee
is the very foundation of the compensation system, and one may con-
fidently expect trouble if the balance is upset too greatly in one direction
or the other. For a long period of time, employees felt that the balance
was tipped too far in the employers' direction; more recently, employers
have argued that the balance was tilted toward the employees' interest
at tremendous economic cost.
Thus, those representing the employers' interests undertook legislative
redress of the balance. A 1981 proposal and a 1982 proposal did not meet
with legislative approval, the latter scuttled by those who had launched
it because they were dissatisfied with the product of the legislative pro-
cess. In the interim between the 1982 regular session and the 1983 extra-
ordinary session, those representing the various sides in the controversy
tried to mediate their differences at the strong encouragement of the gover-
nor. They were ultimately unable to do so, and the bill introduced and
finally passed in the special session was not the product of a compromise.
Rather, it was the proposal of the employer community, and it was a
good deal more pro-employer than either of the recent proposals. The
legislative struggle in the special session was intense but ultimately was
very lopsided. The employer community had the necessary legislative votes
Copyright 1984, by LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW.
* The author acknowledges the assistance of W. Shakespeare, Julius Caesar, act IV,
sc. III, L. 217 in formulating this title. The complete pertinent quotation is:
There is a tide in the affairs of men
Which, taken at the flood, leads on to fortune;
Omitted, all the voyage of their life
Is bound in shallows and miseries.
The use of the phrase from the last line reflects the author's belief that an excellent oppor-
tunity to strike a new balance in the Act was missed in the legislative sessions of 1981
and 1982 and the special session of 1983.
** Professor of Law, Louisiana State University.
1. T. Hobbes, Leviathan pt. 1, ch. 13, at 62. In fairness, it should be noted that
he was speaking of life in a state of "war" as he defined it, as opposed to a state of
"peace." Still, the analogy seems apt.
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and proceeded to pass a bill which was more pro-employer than anything
in recent or past memory.
Some will say that the employees and their supporters are receiving
only their just desserts for years of favoritism under judicial interpreta-
tions of the Act. But it is unseemly for a serious social problem of this
nature to be resolved simply by responses of "it's our turn" or "been
down so long it looks like up to me." The people of Louisiana deserve
more reasoned treatment of this problem than can be gained by treating
the issue as a political football, to be kicked about and ultimately to be
carried over the goal by those who simply have the votes at the moment.
The purpose of this analysis, however, is not to point the finger of
blame at any group or special interest. Its purpose is first to discuss what
the changes are and what they seem to mean. And secondly, its purpose
is to suggest ways in which the Act's extreme positions might be modified
with an interest toward restoring the delicate balance underlying the Act
which simply must be preserved to avoid constant legislative wrangling
over this serious problem.
OVERVIEW OF THE BALANCE
It is appropriate to begin with an overview of the changes in the prom-
inent features of this compensation system and any compensation system.
The point at which the balance is struck on these prominent features has
a great deal to do with the interpretation which courts will give to the
amended provisions, as it has had a great deal to do with their past inter-
pretations.
Four factors have figured prominently into the Louisiana courts' in-
terpretation of the disability provisions of the Act in the past: level of
benefits, judicial speculation in the worker's favor, court administration
of the Act, and prevalence of compromise.2 The 1975 amendments altered
only the level of benefits, and it was predicted that the Louisiana courts
probably would not change their interpretation of the disability provi-
sions significantly because the other factors were still prevalent.' That
prediction was largely validated by the adoption of the odd lot doctrine."
Somewhat the same prediction might be made about the 1983 amend-
ments, but for the fact that the language is intentionally drawn so narrowly
that the judiciary simply may not have the option to do much interpreting.,
The level of benefits arguably has been increased, although in some signifi-
2. See W. MALONE & A. JOHNSON, LOUISIANA WORKERS' COMPENSATION LAW AND
PRACTICE § 274 in 13 LOUISIANA CIVIL LAW TREATISE 607-15 (2d ed. 1980).
3. Id.
4. Id. at § 276 (Supp. 1984).
5. See infra text accompanying note 41.
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cant aspects the level is decreased. There is no change in the specific award
for total and permanent disability: two thirds of the worker's pre-injury
wage during the period of disability without a limitation on the number
of weeks. Of course, the tightened definition of total and permanent
disability will mean that only a miniscule number of awards will be made
under this heading.6 The maximum amount of weekly compensation has
also been increased from two thirds of the average weekly wage to seventy-
five percent of the average weekly wage in all employment. This increase
is less significant than may initially appear, as may be demonstrated by
a series of examples. For ease of calculation, assume that the applicable
average weekly wage in all employment is $300.00 (the actual figure for
the year September 1, 1982 to September 1, 1983 was $306.10). In this
hypothetical example, the maximum weekly compensation under Louisiana
Revised Statute 23:1202 prior to its amendment was $200.00. By defini-
tion, roughly one half (this is an average, not a median, wage) of Louisiana
workers made less than the average weekly wage. The precise percentage
would of course depend upon the actual levels of wages above and below
that average figure.
The increase in the maximum provided by the amendments to section
1202 would fix that amount at $225.00 per week instead of $200.00 per
week in our hypothetical example. Any worker who actually made less
than the average weekly wage would not benefit from the increase in the
maximum at all, for the simple reason that at his level of wages the prior
maximum had never been reached. The worker who made $270.00 per
week would have received $180.00 per week in total disability payments
(two thirds of his wage, subject to the maximum of $200.00 per week)
prior to the amendments. The same worker will still receive $180.00 per
week after the amendments (two thirds of his wage, subject to the max-
imum of $225.00 per week). For this group of workers, there is no change
at all in the level of total and permanent disability benefits. 7
Next assume a worker was making $480.00 per week. Prior to the
amendments he would have been entitled to $200.00 per week, since two
thirds of his wage would have exceeded that ceiling. After the amend-
ments, he is still entitled to two thirds of his wage, but subject to a higher
maximum of $225.00.
And finally assume a worker was making slightly more than the
average weekly wage-say, $330.00 per week. Prior to the amendments,
he was entitled to $200.00, since two thirds of his wage would have
exceeded that maximum. After the amendments, he is entitled to $220.00
6. See infra text accompanying note 36.
7. And the new formula for supplemental earnings benefits will produce benefits for
the worker who earns a lesser wage after his injury which will never be more than those
under the pre-1983 Act. See infra text accompanying notes 16-18.
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per week, since two thirds of his wage would not exceed the statutory
maximum.
In summary, this hypothetical increase in level of benefits from $200.00
to $225.00 per week as a maximum will yield its greatest benefit to those
workers whose actual wage is at least 12.5016 greater than the average
weekly wage in all employment. As to them, the increase will be uniform.
A steadily decreasing benefit is afforded to the group of workers who
earn between 12.5076 above the average weekly wage and the actual average
weekly wage. And for those who earn below the average weekly wage,
there is no change in the level of benefits for total and permanent dis-
ability. This reflects a movement toward a wage-protection concept rather
than impairment of earning capacity. It also gives no increase in benefits
to those who arguably might need that increase most: those who earn
less than the average weekly wage in all employment. A far more signifi-
cant benefit for such workers would have been an increase to seventy-five
percent of their actual wage rather than an increase to seventy-five per-
cent of the average weekly wage as a maximum. Thus, the changes in
the factor of level of benefits result in mixed signals to the judiciary.
As for judicial speculation in the worker's favor and court administra-
tion, superficial progress has been made. There is now an administrator
who may theoretically serve as an arbitrator and continuing supervisor
of a compensation award. But the change in these factors will have to
await judgment as to the efficiency of the director's operation. If he is
well staffed and well funded, he might be able to do that. On the other
hand, he could be overwhelmed and perform little other than a perfunc-
tory review in order to issue the parties a ticket to district court. One
disturbing aspect of that process is that the administrator's investigation
and recommendation are not admissible in the ultimate litigation.8 Once
again, the court may simply have to speculate in the worker's favor because
there is no indication of what alternatives have been made available to him.
The prevalence of compromise may have been reduced slightly by the
commendable statement in Louisiana Revised Statute 23:1271 that periodic
payments are in the best interest of the worker, and that no compromise
may be entered into until six months have elapsed from termination of
temporary total disability. Moreover, no lump sum payment may be made
unless it is demonstrated that such a payment is clearly in the best in-
terests of the parties. 9 These amendments may limit to some extent the
pervasive nature of the compromise and lump sum payment devices, but
that remains to be seen.
In fine, the underlying problems which have led in the past to a liberal
8. See LA. R.S. 23:1310.1 (Supp. 1984).
9. See infra text accompanying note 87.
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judicial interpretation of the disability standard have not been eliminated;
they have been attacked in limited ways. Interestingly, the factor which
most pointed to a narrower reading of the post-1975 disability standard
(level of benefits) has been altered in a restrictive fashion which will not
give relief to those most in need of it.
REVISED DISABILITY PROVISIONS
Attention may now be turned to the most important changes wrought
by Act 1 of the 1983 Extraordinary Session and to the central feature
of any compensation system: the standard for determining disability.
Former Partial Disability: Supplemental Earnings Benefits
The best feature of the major amendments to Act 583 of 1975 was
the emphasis upon partial disability payments as the primary remedy. Total
and permanent disability benefits were supposed to be restricted by the
1975 amendments, and probably were to some extent (though not to the
extent that the employer community wanted). Persons who had been
entitled to total and permanent disability benefits because they could not
return to precisely the same job and perform all the same tasks would,
after 1975, have to be content with partial disability benefits.
Thus, the 1983 amendments commendably retain this emphasis. It is
not, however, especially encouraging to note the severe restrictions placed
on total and permanent disability and to discover upon close examination
that the new formula for those who can find other work after their in-
jury never produces greater benefits than the post-1975 formula.
There had been a glaring deficiency in the 1975 amendments relative
to partial disability. A worker was entitled to two thirds of the difference
between his pre-injury wage and any post-injury wages that he "actually
earns." Understandably, this phrase was interpreted (though reluctantly
in some instances) as meaning precisely what it said: measurement of actual
earnings.' 0 If a worker capable of earning wages nonetheless did not for
whatever reason, there was no change in his level of benefits. Thus, for
all practical purposes, a worker who chose to do so could draw the max-
imum benefits for 450 weeks by simply not working. He would thus receive
identical benefits during those weeks to those received by a totally and
permanently disabled worker."
In order to remedy this evil, the employer community decided to pur-
10. See Schouest v. J. Ray McDermott & Co., 411 So. 2d 1042 (La. 1982); Scott v.
Sears, Roebuck & Co., 406 So. 2d 701 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1981); Mayes v. Louisiana-Pacific
Corp., 379 So. 2d 46 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 381 So. 2d 1232 (La. 1980).
11. This satisfies no one's sense of propriety and was an unwise, though not inadver-
tent, legislative choice. See W. MALONE & A. JOHNSON, supra note 2, § 275, at 619.
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sue the pure wage-loss concept adopted by Florida in 1979. Although the
concept was bruited about in the legislative halls as a novel approach,
it is in fact the original approach to workers' compensation problems.
Compensation was intended as a scheme to replace lost earning capacity,
and one of the simplest measures of earning capacity is the ability to
earn wages in the competitive marketplace of workers. This test is not
infallible, since a number of factors other than the worker's earning capa-
city might affect the matter (general economic conditions, helpful
employers or co-employees, geographical location, and the like). But the
test is simple and direct, and has a good deal to recommend it.
Thus, in the 1981 proposal' 2 and the 1982 proposal, 3 a wage-loss
treatment of'the partially disabled worker was advanced, by name, for
legislative consideration. Even in those proposals, the Louisiana employer
community had gone the Florida statute one better. The Florida statute
provides for compensation in such instances at the level of ninety-five
percent of the difference between eighty-five percent of the employee's
average monthly wage and the amount of post-injury wages he is able
to earn on a monthly basis after reaching maximum medical
improvement."' The first two Louisiana proposals fixed the level of com-
pensation at eighty percent of the difference between ninety percent of
the pre-injury wages he was able to earn.
The difference in the two schemes may be seen by taking a Florida
worker and a Louisiana worker, each earning $200.00 per week prior to
injury and able to earn nothing for a certain number of weeks. Using
a conversion factor of 4.3 from weekly to monthly income (as Florida
apparently would)," the Florida worker was making $860.00 in average
pre-injury monthly wages. During those weeks in which the workers are
able to earn nothing, the Florida worker would be entitled to $161.50
per week (85% of $860.00 is $731.00; 95% of the difference between
$731.00 and nothing is $694.45; $694.45 divided by 4.3 is $161.50). The
Louisiana worker would have been entitled to $144.00 under the same
circumstances (90% of $860.00 is $774.00; 80% of the difference between
$774.00 and nothing is $619.20 divided by 4.3 is $144.00).16
The 1982 proposal did not pass, and in the successful 1983 proposal,
12. La. H.R. 986, 7th Reg. Sess. (1981).
13. La. H.R. 256, 8th Reg. Sess. (1982).
14. FLA. STAT. ANN. § 440.15(3)(b) (West 1981).
15. Though the Florida provision is written in terms of monthly benefits, it does not
contain this specific conversion factor. The 4.3 figure is found in FLA. STAT. ANN. § 440.12(3),
which specifies that a monthly wage loss amount may not be more than 4.3 times the weekly
maximum amount fixed by section 440.02.
16. These proposals did not contain a 4.3 conversion factor, however. Benefits were
described as being payable on a weekly basis. But, for ease of comparison in this example,
the conversion factor has been used.
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even the more limited wage-loss formula of the prior proposals was further
restricted. Apparently, to satisfy some objection to the phrase "wage-loss,"
the term given to such benefits was changed to "supplemental earnings
benefits" (SEB). The substance was precisely the same as the earlier propo-
sals, except at an even further reduced level of benefits. As enacted, Loui-
siana Revised Statutes 23:1221(3.) now specifies that the Louisiana worker
who is able to earn wages is entitled to seventy-four percent of the dif-
ference between ninety percent of his former monthly wage and the amount
of monthly wages he is able to earn after the injury.' 7 The conversion
factor of 4.3 weeks per month is specifically included in the statute. So
the Louisiana worker who was earning $200.00 per week ($860.00 per
month) prior to the injury, and nothing in certain weeks thereafter will
be entitled under the new provisions to $133.20 per week (90% of $860.00
is $774.00; 74% of the difference between $774.00 and nothing is $572.76;
$572.76 divided by 4.3 is $133.20).. This same worker would have received
$133.00 per week under the 1975 Louisiana amendments, $161.50 under
the Florida law, and $144.00 under the 1981 and 1982 Louisiana pro-
posals.
The reduction in such benefits under Act 1 of the 1983 Extraordinary
Session becomes more pronounced as the worker earns more in post-injury
wages. Suppose now a worker was making $300.00 per week prior to in-
jury ($1290.00 per month) and can make $160.00 per week ($688.00 per
month) after his injury. Under Florida law, he would be entitled to $90.24
per week; under former Louisiana law, $93.33 per week; under the 1981
and 1982 Louisiana proposals, $88.00;" under the 1983 amendments,
$81.40. Even the increase in maximum number of weeks for such payments
from 450 to 520 weeks will not make up the- difference in most cases.
The worker who draws all 520 weekly checks of $81.40 receives a total
of $42,328.00, and the one who draws 450 weekly checks of $93.33 receives
a total of $41,998.50. The worker who for some reason does not draw
the last five weekly checks under the extended 520-week provision comes
out worse in the overall amount as well as the weekly amounts.
And of course, the worker who is able to earn ninety percent or more
of his former wage is entitled to no SEB at all, and prior to the amend-
ments he would have been entitled to a small amount per week (ten per-
cent of the difference between his old wage and his new wage).
The use of a monthly wage figure for- these calculations is puzzling
in light of the fact that the Louisiana act has always been keyed to weekly
wage figures. Indeed, many of the workers primarily affected by the Act
17. The figure of 74% is clearly a compromise between the prior law's two thirds and
the prior proposals' 800o.
18. This figure is arrived at by using a 4.3 conversion factor. Without the conversion
factor the amount per week would be greater.
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are paid on a weekly basis. The simple reason for its use is that Florida
appears to use such a factor. Additionally, and probably not coinciden-
tally, the conversion factor will diminish payable benefits in certain
instances.1 9 Consider our worker who was making $300.00 per week prior
to his injury ($7.50 per hour). He returns to work and makes in four
successive weeks $150.00, $300.00, $300.00, and $360.00, the last by work-
ing overtime. Under Louisiana Revised Statutes 23:1021(10), his average
weekly wage would work out to be more than 90% of his pre-injury wage,
and with the conversion factor he would not be entitled to any SEB. Under
the prior law with weekly calculations, he would have been entitled to
$100.00 during the first week.20
The drafters of the 1983 amendments were careful to close the
"actually earns" loophole, and understandably so. The Florida statute
had always contained the phrase "is able to earn," and that phrase replaces
"actually earns" in the basic SEB provisions in Louisiana Revised Statutes
23:1221(3)(a). The previous language relative to earnings in any
employment-whether the same or not, whether that for which he was
trained or not-is supplemented by the addition of the phrase "or self-
employment." And then subsection 1221(3)(b) provides: "[T]he amount
determined to be the wages the employee is able to earn in any month
shall in no case be less than the sums actually received by the employee,
including, but not limited to, earnings from odd-lot employment, sheltered
employment, and employment while working in any pain." This is similar
to the Florida provision with a few Louisiana embellishments (the specific
references to odd lot employment and working in pain).
And subsection 1221(3)(c)(i) further provides that the post-injury earn-
ings figure might sometimes actually be more than actual earnings:
[If the employee is not engaged in any employment or self-
employment . . . or is earning wages less than the employee is
able to earn, the amount determined to be the wages the employee
is able to earn in any month shall in no case be less than the
sum the employee would have earned in any employment or self-
employment . . . which he was physically able to perform, and
(1) which he was offered or tendered by the employer or any other
employer, or (2) which is proven available to the employee in the
employee's or employer's community or reasonable geographic
region.
19. Even the use of 4.3 instead of the more accurate conversion factor of 4.33 will
decrease a worker's benefit. The worker who draws $300.00 per week for an entire year
draws $15,600.00 in total dollars. Under the conversion factor of 4.3, he will be deemed
to have drawn $15,480.00 ($300.00 times 4.3 equals $1,290.00 times 12 equals $15,480.00).
This slight difference will ultimately yield a smaller benefit once all of the calculations are
complete.
20. Two thirds of the difference between $300.00 and $150.00.
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The Florida provision on the same point speaks of an employee who
"voluntarily limits his income or fails to accept employment commen-
surate with his abilities."'"
The only way for a worker to avoid being deemed to have earned
the wages in the proffered or available employment which he does not
accept is to prove under Louisiana Revised Statutes 23:1221(3)(c)(ii) "by
clear and convincing evidence, unaided by any presumption of disability,
that solely as a consequence of substantial pain, the employee can not
perform" such employment.
The general thrust of this amendment is clear and understandable.
There is room for abuse, however. Suppose the worker's employer proves
that there is a job which the worker can physically perform available in
the "employer's" community, though he does not actually offer it to the
worker. And suppose that the employer is a statewide corporation and
interprets this section to mean that its "community" is the entire state.
If the worker is unable or unwilling to move to another portion of the
state to take this "available" job, a literal reading of the statute would
require that the earnings he would have received be counted against his
compensation benefit. Such a reading would be patently unfair but not
entirely inconsistent with the language of the statute.22
Termination of the right to supplemental earnings benefits also under-
went change in the 1983 amendments. Although the same basic scheme
was retained, the specific limit to the maximum number of weeks of such
benefits increased from 450 to 520 under the amendments. The employer
continues to receive credit against the maximum for a week in which he
pays any amount in SEB, but he gets no credit against the maximum
for weeks in which he pays nothing.23 Thus, though there is a limit to
520 weeks of actual payments, there is no limit to 520 calendar weeks.
But there are two additional termination points not present prior to
the amendments. One of these blends SEB into retirement or social security
benefits. Supplemental earnings benefits terminate "[w]hen the employee
retires or begins to receive old age insurance benefits under Title II of
the Social Security Act, whichever comes first." ' In this event, however,
a minimum of 104 weeks of SEB are payable.
The second provision terminates SEB "[als of the end of any two-
year period commencing after termination of temporary total disability,
unless during such two-year period supplemental earnings benefits have
21. FLA. STAT. ANN. § 440.15(3)(b)(2) (West 1981).
22. Some may find this reading implausible. But if the employee's and the employer's
community is meant to be one and the same, why put in the statute "in the employee's
or employer's community"?
23. LA. R.S. 23:1221(3)(d)(ii) (Supp. 1984).
24. LA. R.S. 23:1221(3)(d)(iii) (Supp. 1984).
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been payable during at least thirteen consecutive weeks." 2" This provision
is borrowed from the Florida statute26 and was found in both the 1981
and 1982 proposals.2 7 The surface intent of the provision is to terminate
such benefits when they seem not to be needed. If a worker has, over
a two-year period, been able to earn ninety percent or more of his former
wage in all but three months (recall that the 4.3 conversion factor means
he may earn less than ninety percent in some weeks but still not receive
benefits for that month), then arguably he no longer needs this subsidy.
A two-year period of surveillance may be sufficient in some cases,
but not in others. What if the worker suffers the termination of benefits
under this provision, but then is unable to do as well in the next two
or three years? There is no specific authority for beginning SEB payments
again, and there could be some doubt about the worker's right to review
under Louisiana Revised Statute 23:1331 in light of the specific statement
in that section that it "shall not apply to the calculation of the monthly
benefit amount" under SEB.28 It is the worker's responsibility under
subsection 1221(3)(f) to report any right to SEB to the employer or in-
surer within thirty days after the week in question.29 What major harm
could there be in requiring the employer or insurer to simply put the file
on hold, even though two years might have passed, until the employer
or insurer hears from the employee?
It also seems that an unscrupulous employer could offer the injured
employee two jobs so that he could make ninety percent of his prior
wage, 3" and maintain him ih that status until twelve weeks short of tWo
years from termination of temporary total disability. If the worker is then
cut back to one job at below ninety percent of his prior wage, what remedy
does he have?
At the very least, it should be held that although SEB payments "ter-
minate" upon the occurrence of the conditions described, they can be
reinstituted by the employee if he pursues the ordinary processes and proves
that he is again entitled to them. In other words, the stoppage of payments
would be more in the nature of a suspension than a termination. Other-
wise, tremendous unfairness could be introduced into the Act. And worse,
the concept of continuing subsidy for those who need it would be violated.
25. LA. R.S. 23:1221(3)(dXi) (Supp. 1984).
26. FLA. STAT. ANN. § 440.15(3)(b)(3)(a) (West 1981).
27. See bills cited respectively supra notes 12-13.
28. LA. R.S. 23:1331(D) (Supp. 1984).
29. Supplemental earnings benefit payments must be based on actual reports. As
amended, LA. R.S. 23:1222 will not permit the award of SEB based upon "probable dura-
tion of loss of wages." Prior to amendment, the section had permitted temporary disability
awards based on "probable duration" of the disability.
30. Alternatively, an industrious worker could hold two jobs with different employers
and achieve a total of 90%'o or more of his former wage.
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Revised Standards for Total Disability
As a part of the major 1975 amendments, the employer community
gave up the specific limitation (then 500) on the number of weeks of
payments awardable for total and permanent disability along with other
concessions. In turn, the definition of total and permanent disability was
significantly tightened. At the very least, awards such as those under the
prior law for total and permanent disability for those who could work
anywhere else but their former job would no longer be available.
Understandably, the employer community thought the number of total
and permanent disability awards would significantly decrease.
Predictably, the employer community was dismayed by a few early
and rather lenient decisions by the appellate courts." Rather than waiting
for a few years of judicial refinement or opting for a rejuvenated partial
disability provision calling for a return to the wage-loss principle only,
the employer community began building momentum for another defini-
tion of the disability standards.
In the interim between 1975 and 1983, the Louisiana Supreme Court
had adopted the odd lot doctrine. After earlier liberal interpretations, the
appellate courts had begun to settle down to a realistic use of the doc-
trine, incorporating the substantial-pain cases into it.32 In time, the doc-
trine would likely have proved to be a reasonable approach to total and
permanent disability cases, though the balance would probably not have
been struck where the employer community would have wanted it.
Despite the fact that the odd lot doctrine in some form is in use in
most jurisdictions, the 1983 amendments specifically prohibit its use as
well as any working-in-pain doctrines which might lead to total and per-
manent disability awards. This is accomplished by amendments to Loui-
siana Revised Statutes 23:1221(2) which replace the phrase inability "to
engage in any gainful occupation for wages" with the phrase "to engage
in any self-employment or occupation for wages"; 33 provide that com-
pensation for total and permanent disability benefits "shall not be awarded
if the employee is engaged in any employment or self-employment
... including but not limited to any and all odd-lot employment, sheltered
employment, or employment while working in any pain"; 3 ' and specify
31. They were especially dismayed with Phillips v. Dresser Eng'g Co., 351 So. 2d 304
(La. App. 3d Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 353 So. 2d 1048 (La. 1978), an opinion giving an
extremely lenient reading of the revised standards without consideration of the alteration
of benefits suggested by Professor Malone and this writer. W. MALONE & A. JOHNSON,
supra note 2, § 277, at 269.
32. W. MALONE & A. JOHNSON, supra note 2, § 277 (Supp. 1984). In the most recent
year, for example, the number of cases in which the odd lot doctrine was unsuccessfully
argued approximately equalled those in which it was successfully argued.
33. LA. R.S. 23:1221(2)(a) (Supp. 1984).
34. LA. R.S. 23:1221(2)(b) (Supp. 1984).
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that whenever the employee is not working, such benefits may be awarded
only if the employee proves by clear and convincing evidence,
unaided by any presumption of disability, that the employee is
physically unable to engage in any employment or self-
employment, regardless of the nature or character of the employ-
ment or self-employment, including, but not limited to, any and
all odd-lot employment, sheltered employment, or employment
while working in any pain,
notwithstanding its "location or availability." 5
By any interpretation, this provision will make awards for total and
permanent disability almost nonexistent. Any injured worker who returns
to work in any capacity and in whatever degree of pain will not be totally
and permanently disabled. And any worker who does not return to work
is entitled to compensation for permanent total disability only if he proves
by clear and convincing evidence that there is no work anywhere that
he can do, even that which he would have to perform in substantial pain.
One can conceive of the case of an injured pulpwood worker in Mound
who cannot return to that work or any other work available in the
reasonable geographic region. He probably could handle completely seden-
tary jobs, such as the sorting and wrapping of plastic tableware for a
catering service. Such jobs exist only in Lafayette and New Orleans,36
though none are available at the moment. Even then, he would suffer
substantial pain if required to work an eight-hour day. If he cannot prove
by clear and convincing evidence that such jobs do not exist, he is not
entitled to total and permanent disability benefits. Even the Florida source
provision is not so stringent," and Larson terms its burden on the ques-
tion "a stiff one." 3 8 He will probably have to come up with a new adjec-
tive to describe Louisiana's new standard.39
Certainly one cannot contend that the pre-1975 Louisiana standard
35. LA. R.S. 23:1221(2)(c) (Supp. 1984).
36. Or for that matter, they may exist in Seattle, Washington since the statute does
not specify location within Louisiana.
37. See FLA. STAT. ANN. § 440.15(l)(b) (West 1981). It reads:
Loss of both hands, or both arms, or both feet, or both legs, or both eyes, or
of any two thereof or paraplegia or quadriplegia shall, in the absence of con-
clusive proof of a substantial earning capacity, constitute permanent total disability.
In all other cases permanent total disability shall be determined in accordance
with the facts. In such other cases, no compensation shall be payable . . . if
the employee is engaged in, or is physically capable of engaging in, gainful employ-
ment; and the burden shall be upon the employee to establish that he is not able
uninterruptedly to do even light work due to physical limitation.
38. 2 A. LARSON, THE LAW OF WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION § 57.15 (1982).
39. No exhaustive search has been made, but it is difficult to believe that any state
would have a standard more restrictive than the new Louisiana statute.
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was a good one, though there were reasons for its existence.40 Nor can
one call a standard which would exclude from total and permanent benefits
those who are reasonably capable of earning wages at another job unfair.
But the pity of the present standard is that it is so one-sided and in-
flexible that it risks causing serious injustice in some cases. It may cause
the judiciary to find other, more flexible points at which to adjust the
balance.41 The odd lot doctrine, properly interpreted in light of increased
benefits and no limitation on number of weeks, coupled with an amended
partial-disability section similar to the new SEB provisions, would prob-
ably have accomplished the same result without going to the extreme.
If an employee should happen to get a judgment of total and perma-
nent disability even under these restrictive standards, Louisiana Revised
Statutes 23:1211(2)(d) provides that if he subsequently receives "any earn-
ings," he "shall not" receive the total and permanent disability benefits,
but rather shall receive SEB payments. It is unclear whether this is meant
to authorize an employer or insurer to ignore a judgment awarding total
and permanent disability benefits and begin SEB payments without seek-
ing modification under Louisiana Revised Statutes 23:1331. Indubitably,
in light of the tenor of the remainder of the section, it is intended that
this will occur without supervision of the director or the district court
and without scrutiny of the process by which it is established that the
worker has "any earnings.""'
In addition, no judgment of total and permanent disability may be
entered prior to an evaluation of rehabilitation possibilities 3 or during
a rehabilitation program." In the latter instance, the worker is entitled
to temporary total disability benefits for the duration of the program."
Revised Schedule A wards: Permanent Partial Disability
There were only four changes to the so-called schedule awards in the
40. See W. MALONE & A. JOHNSON, supra note 2, § 274.
41. Perhaps the court would hold that loss of consortium by the spouse and children
of an injured worker is not barred by the exclusivity provision. Or perhaps it would hold
the immunity of the principal unconstitutional when the principal has not actually paid
compensation. Or perhaps it would hold an employer liable vicariously through its inter-
pretation of the intentional-act exclusion. Or perhaps it might hold that since a back injury
which does not prevent a worker from earning 90% of his former wage is no longer com-
pensable under the former schedule loss provisions, it might serve as the basis for a tort
action. One of these options has already occurred. See Jones v. Thomas, 426 So. 2d 609
(La. 1983) (employer vicariously liable for intentional act of employee).
42. See S. NILES, 1983 AMENDMENTS-LoUISIANA WORKER'S COMPENSATION ACT-
COMMENTARY AND REVIEW 59 (1983) (prepared for Independent Insurance Agents of Loui-
siana) ("Termination of total disability benefits will be applied automatically.").
43. LA. R.S. 23:1226(D) (Supp. 1984).
44. LA. R.S. 23:1223(2)(e), :1226(G) (Supp. 1984).
45. LA. R.S. 23:1226(F) (Supp. 1984).
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1983 amendments. First, these benefits are now called "permanent par-
tial disability" benefits and are "solely for anatomical loss of use or
amputation" 6 to the specified members. The use of the word
"anatomical" probably is intended to make certain that no award will
be made for "loss of function" when no "anatomical" loss has occur-
red. But the word "anatomical" could be interpreted broadly enough to
include such loss of function, since that is an effect on the anatomy.
Second, and most important, a new subsection, Louisiana Revised
Statute 23:1221(4)(q), now provides that no benefits shall be "awarded
or payable" under any portion of the permanent partial disability provi-
sions unless the anatomical loss of use or amputation, or loss of physical
function under 23:1221(4)(p), is greater than fifty percent as established
in the American Medical Association's Guides to the Evaluation of Per-
manent Impairment. A review of that volume demonstrates that such
ratings are very rare, and the net effect of this limitation will certainly
be to limit any schedule awards to a very few cases.
This limitation is entirely consistent with the adherence to the wage-
loss principle expressed in the 1983 amendments. A schedule of benefits
for losses which do not impair earning capacity, or do so in a very limited
fashion, is the antithesis of the wage-loss concept. Florida, for example,
usually cited as the progenitor of the modem return to the wage-loss con-
cept, has no schedule losses in the ordinary sense of the word. 7 The 1981
proposal and the 1982 proposal contained no schedule whatsoever." The
theme of wage-loss is very clear: if the injury does not produce loss of
wages, it should not be compensable. The schedule provisions had been
interpreted in Louisiana as being a "minimum" award for the worker
even when he could not prove any economic disability from the injury."9
These interpretations continued after the major amendments in 1975.50
The over-fifty percent limitation will severely curtail such awards, and
in theory will push more claimants over into the supplemental earnings
benefits category. There is nothing inherently wrong with that approach,
but the over-fifty percent limitation may be too severe.
Third, the provisions governing partial loss of use were also amended
to decrease the potential benefits in certain cases. Prior to the amend-
ments of 1983, Louisiana Revised Statutes 23:1221(4)(o) provided for com-
pensation in cases of partial loss of use in "such proportion to the amounts
named herein for the total loss of such members as the disability to such
members bears to the total loss of the member." For example, a worker
46. LA. R.S. 23:1221(4) (Supp. 1984).
47. See FLA. STAT. ANN. § 440.15(3)(a) (West Supp. 1983).
48. See bills cited respectively supra notes 12-13.
49. See Lacour v. Highlands Ins. Co., 247 So. 2d 611 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1971).
50. See Jacks v. Banister Pipelines America, 418 So. 2d 524 (La. 1982).
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who suffered total loss of his hand would be entitled to two thirds of
his wages during 150 weeks. A worker who suffered a fifty-five percent
loss to his hand would be entitled to fifty-five percent of two thirds of
his wage during 150 weeks." Thus, if the two workers earned $150.00
per week apiece, the first would be entitled to $100.00 per week for 150
weeks, and the second $55.00 per week during 150 weeks-except the se-
cond worker would be entitled to the statutory minimum, which in
1982-1983 was $61.00 per week.
The amended provision states that compensation in such cases shall
bear "such proportion to the number of weeks provided for herein for
the total loss of such members as the percentage loss or impairment to
such members bears to the total loss of the member." This provision might
have made a bigger impact on benefits payable had the over-fifty percent
limitation not been enacted. Under the prior law, with a small percentage
disability, a worker might nonetheless be entitled to the minimum award
for the full number of weeks." After the over-fifty percent limitations,
it will be rare that a worker's calculated benefit will fall below the statutory
minimum of twenty percent of the average weekly wage in all employment.
The second worker in the hypothetical, for example, works for just
about the minimum wage in a forty-hour week, earning $150.00 per week.
With a fifty-five percent disability to the hand, he will now be entitled
to $100.00 per week for 82.5 weeks (55% of 150 weeks), whereas under
the former provision he was entitled to $61.00 (the current statutory
minimum) for 150 weeks. Still, there is a slight decrease in total benefits
for the injury (from $9,150.00 to $8,250.00) at the lowest level of the
wage scale. And, of course, should his disability be rated at fifty percent
or less, he will get nothing at all under the amended schedule provisions.
The fourth change expands the presumption of total and permanent
disability resulting from specific losses to include loss of both arms or
both legs and to include paraplegia or quadraplegia. Absent "conclusive
proof of a substantial earning capacity," 3 a judgment of total and per-
manent disability is appropriate. However, one may presume that such
51. For an application of this formula, see Stracener v. United States Fidelity & Guar.
Co., 410 So. 2d 1220 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1982). The same case at the supreme court level
resulted in a finding of partial disability, more beneficial to the employee than the schedule
benefit. Stracener v. United States Fidelity & Guar. Co., 420 So. 2d 1101 (La. 1982).
52. The same worker who earned $150.00 per week but suffered only a 200o disability
to the hand would be entitled to 20% of two thirds of wages for 150 weeks, or $20.00
per week. But he would have received the statutory minimum of $61.00 per week for 150
weeks-a substantial difference. Now, since the schedule losses must be greater than 50%,
the incidence of such awards will be greatly reduced, as will the disparity between the calculated
benefit and the statutory minimum. But the combination of the over-50% limitation and
the new formula for partial loss will work a hardship on all those who suffer a 50% disability
or less, and on certain over-50% disability workers at the lower end of the wage scale.
53. LA. R.S. 23:1221(4)tj) (Supp. 1984).
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a person who thereafter earned anything at all, even in sheltered employ-
ment, would be subject to loss of those benefits under Louisiana Revised
Statute 23:1221(2)(d).
Role of Pain Arguments After 1983 Amendments
Arguments that the employee is working in pain or would have to
work in pain after his injury will have reduced importance after the 1983
amendments. This was clearly the intent of the amended provisions.
In a total and permanent disability argument, pain will now have no
role to play at all. The fact that an employee can work but only in substan-
tial pain will not make him totally disabled, since he must prove that
there is no job he can do, even in "any" pain."4
In a case involving a claim for supplemental earnings benefits, pain
arguments might play a limited role. An employee who is not working
and is able to prove by clear and convincing evidence that the reason
is "solely ... substantial pain"" would be entitled to prevent an employer
from counting as post-injury wages the amounts which he could earn in
that pain. Still this is a difficult burden, beyond the ordinary standard
in civil cases. It will not be surprising to find employees unable to satisfy
that burden, and thus to have counted as post-injury earnings monies which
they could earn in pain though they actually do not or cannot.
Arguments of pain, substantial or less so, have been disputed issues
in every jurisdiction. Often subjective, very difficult to prove, and
sometimes downright suspicious, such claims have bedeviled the courts
for decades. It is thus quite understandable that the 1983 amendments
would take out after such arguments. But the extreme position adopted
may prove to be short-sighted. The Louisiana Act is left in the very in-
humane posture of (a) caring not a whit about pain with regard to a
total and permanent disability claim and (b) caring only a little more in
an SEB case, and only if an employee can discharge the increased stand-
ard of proof that he cannot work "solely" because of "substantial pain."
Again, the inflexibility of such an approach may one day prove its
undoing.
Effect of 1983 Amendments on Disabling Effects from Mental Causes
There is an almost imperceptible language change in the disability pro-
visions after the 1983 amendments which may have been intended to
54. LA. R.S. 23:1221(2)(a)-(c) (Supp. 1984).
55. LA. R.S. 23:1221(3)(c)(ii) (Supp. 1984). This appears to have been one of the very
few employer concessions in the discussions after the 1982 regular session. It was not found
in either the 1981 or the 1982 proposal, and is not found in the Florida statute.
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eliminate awards for disability traceable to mental causes. 6 Under Loui-
siana Revised Statutes 23:1221(2)(c), when an injured employee is not
engaged in any type of employment after recovering from the injury, an
award of total and permanent disability may be made "only if the
employee proves by clear and convincing evidence ...that the employee
is physically unable to engage in any employment." 5 7 Thus it would be
open to an employer to argue that an employee who proved by this dif-
ficult standard of proof that he was mentally unable to engage in any
employment had not established a case for total and permanent disability.
If this is in fact the intent of the provision, it represents a giant step
backwards. Only recently have the workings of the mind in response to
trauma or other stimuli become somewhat clearer, and concomitantly only
recently has there been sufficient sophistication to recognize that workplace
injuries might produce either physically or mentally disabling consequences,
or both. An individual is just as disabled in the economic sense, whether
the source of his disability be in physical or mental causes. There is no
reason to revert to the turn of the century with such an amendment and
uniformly exclude all such claims regardless of the quality of proof. 8
Proof of Disability After 1983 Amendments
Proof of disability presumably will take on a different appearance
after the 1983 amendments. Louisiana Revised Statutes 23:1221 was
substantially amended to impose a higher standard of proof on an
employee seeking to establish disability. Moreover, use of "any presump-
tion of disability" is not permitted, though the precise meaning of this
phrase in this context is unclear.
Louisiana Revised Statutes 23:1221(2)(c) provides that if an employee
is not engaged in any type of employment and claims total and perma-
nent disability, he must prove "by clear and convincing evidence, unaided
56. Indeed, it is contended in one writer's interpretation of the Act that this was precisely
the intent. "The test for disability is a physical inability and not a mental disability. Reasonable
interpretation suggests that mental disability is not considered. Clearly, the intent was 'to
exclude disability from mental incapacity. The subjectivity of claims premised upon mental
disability cannot be avoided; hence, such claims are excluded." S. Nn.Es, supra note 42, at 57.
57. Emphasis added. Similarly, in order to avoid the conclusion that wages he "could
have earned" will be counted against supplemental earnings benefits, an employee must
prove that he cannot perform offered or available employment "solely as a consequence
of substantial pain." LA. R.S. 23:1221(3)(c)(ii) (Supp. 1984). Does this mean that an employee
who shows he is mentally disabled to perform the proffered employment (though not in
pain) will fail to discharge that burden?
58. Perhaps the court can simply hold that "physically" is broad enough to cover the
entire body and all disability which affects it, just as it interpreted the definitions of "acci-
dent" and "injury" to include mental consequences though "violence to the physical struc-
ture of the body" was specified in the statute.
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by any presumption of disability," that he is "physically unable to engage
in any employment . . ., including, but not limited to, any and all odd-
lot employment, sheltered employment, or employment while working in
any pain, notwithstanding the location or availability of any such employ-
ment." The Florida source provision is not as restrictive. It requires simply
that in the case of a non-working employee, "the burden shall be upon
the employee to establish that he is not able uninterruptedly to do even
light work due to physical limitation." 9 The Louisiana provisions actually
became progressively more restrictive as the legislative wars went on. The
1981 proposal6" tracked the Florida language precisely on this point. The
1982 proposal" which died in the waning hours of the session simply
deleted the word "uninterruptedly." But after the governor's ad hoc task
force had met and the 1983 proposal was introduced, this stronger language
was included in the bill and never left it.
Even proof of disability sufficient to be entitled to SEB has become
more burdensome for the employee. If an employee is not engaged in
any employment, or is earning lower wages than he was prior to injury,
the amount of post-injury wages which will go into the calculation for
SEB is the amount that he "would have earned in any employment
• . . which he was physically able to perform" 6 and which was offered
to him or proven available to him. In order to prevent the inclusion of
wages which he "could have earned" in the calculation, the employee
must under Louisiana Revised Statutes 23:1221(3)(c)(ii) establish "by clear
and convincing evidence, unaided by any presumption of disability, that
solely as a consequence of substantial pain," he cannot perform the
tendered or available employment. There is no similar Florida provision.
That statute confines itself to the statement that whenever a wage-loss
(SEB) benefit is payable, "the burden shall be on the employee to establish
that any wage loss claimed is the result of the compensable injury. "63
These are difficult burdens for the worker, and the changes clearly
reflect the intent that awards for total and permanent disability should
be very unusual and that maximum awards for SEB for those "able to
work" should also be rare. Even so, it is difficult to justify the "clear
and convincing evidence" standard. Not only is compensation litigation
an ordinary civil proceeding in which a reasonable preponderance of the
evidence is sufficient in almost every instance, it has always been treated
as social legislation in which the worker is entitled to somewhat lenient
59. FLA. STAT. ANN. § 440.15(1)(b) (West 1981). Even this lesser standard (than Loui-
siana's) is termed by Larson "a stiff one." A. LARSON, supra note 38, § 57.15.
60. La. H.R. 986, 7th Reg. Sess. (1981).
61. La. H.R. 256, 8th Reg. Sess. (1982).
62. LA. R.S. 23:1221(3)(c)(i) (Supp. 1984).
63. FLA. STAT. ANN. § 440.15(3)(b)(2) (West 1981).
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treatment. Such a standard of proof is inconsistent with seventy years
of interpretation of the Act, without any demonstrable reason appearing
for the change. Simply placing the burden on the employee would have
been a sufficient alteration of the balance on the question of proof.
What may have been meant by "unaided by any presumption of
disability" is uncertain. Some believe that this language was aimed at the
presumption found in numerous cases that a claimant's disability is pre-
sumed to have resulted from an accident if prior to the accident the claim-
ant was in good health but afterwards the symptoms of disability appear,
so long as the medical evidence supports a causal link between the acci-
dent and the disability. 64 But this is not a "presumption of disability."
Rather, it is a presumption of causal relationship between an accident
and disability once the disability is established by other means. Thus
the new phrase in the statute cannot properly be interpreted as affecting
this presumption of causation.
The phrase perhaps was intended to attack the odd lot doctrine from
another angle. The doctrine was specifically overruled elsewhere in Loui-
siana Revised Statutes 23:1221. Since it established a sort of presumption
of total and permanent disability, after a prima facie showing, which the
employer had to overcome, perhaps this phrase is meant simply as another
way of overruling that doctrine.
But perhaps the most likely explanation is that the phrase is simply
an additional statement of the difficulty of the employee's burden, and
is largely superfluous in light of the "clear and convincing evidence" stan-
dard found elsewhere in section 1221.65
Disfigurement and Impairment of Physical Function After 1983
Louisiana Revised Statutes 23:1221(4)(p), as amended in 1983, expands
potential awards for disfigurement but restricts awards for loss or im-
pairment of physical function.6 6 The explanation of awards for disfigure-
ment is accomplished by deletion of the qualifying phrase "about the face
or head," which probably entered the Act in the first place only to express
64. See W. MALONE & A. JOHNSON, supra note 2, § 252.
65. See S. NILFS, supra note 42, at 57 ("The employee may not rely upon presumption
or fiction, but he must provide real evidence.").
66. Except in a very limited sense, the Florida statute which served as the source of
most of the 1983 amendments has no schedule losses. Such losses, not being based on actual
wage loss, would be inconsistent with Florida's firm commitment to the wage-loss principle.
In fact, it is somewhat surprising that the schedule was retained in the 1983 amendments.
Neither the 1981 proposal nor the 1982 proposal contained schedule losses, and thus were
more faithful to the Florida source provisions. While the 1983 amendments did contain
the schedule, the new provision in subsection 1221(4)(q) limiting any schedule award to
percentage ratings of loss of use of 50% or more makes its reach very narrow indeed.
See supra text accompanying notes 46-48.
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the facts of Boyer v. Crescent Paper Box Factory.67 The amended subsec-
tion thus would permit an award for serious and permanent disfigure-
ment regardless of its location on the body. The award continues to be
available without reference to any disability.
The loss of physical function portion of the provision has been
narrowed, however. Formerly, serious and permanent impairment of the
"usefulness of a physical function" was cognizable under the Act. Now
only such impairment of the "respiratory system, gastro-intestinal system,
or genito-urinary system, as contained within the thoracic or abdominal
cavities" is compensable. The very clear intention of this amendment was
to exclude claims for impairment of the function of the back or neck.
Awards in pre-1983 cases for impairment of function of the lungs would
probably still be cognizable, but awards relating to teeth, the mouth, the
ankle, the shoulder, the sense of hearing or smell, or to reproductive
capacity would be in serious doubt." A broad reading of the provision
might reach some of these, but certainly not all.
The maximum award of two thirds of wages during one hundred weeks
is retained, but some language is added to guide the court in its deter-
mination of how much of the award should be made in a given case.
When the loss of function is susceptible of a percentage determination,
the compensation is to be determined according to the formula in Loui-
siana Revised Statutes 1221(4)(o): compensation to bear such proportion
to the number of weeks (presumably one hundred) for total loss as the
percentage impairment bears to total loss. 6 9 And if the impairment is not
susceptible of percentage determination, the subsection retains the pre-
sent standard of compensation in "reasonable" proportion to that pro-
vided for cases of "specific disability."
The net result of these amendments seems to be that impairment of
the function of the back, neck, or other portions of the body not con-
tained within the new language, if the impairment does not cause suffi-
cient wage loss to permit an award of SEB, will go without any remedy
whatsoever. A worker who suffers a back injury but with minimal residual
disability such that he can return to another job at ninety percent or more
of his former wage will have no remedy under the Act.
PROCEEDINGS BEFORE THE DIRECTOR AND RELATED PROCEDURAL CHANGES
The introduction of a new level of dispute resolution under the Act
67. 143 La. 368, 78 So. 596 (1918).
68. See W. MALONE & A. JOHNSON, supra note 2, § 286.
69. This formula is reached by paraphrasing LA. R.S. 2 3 :122 1(4)(p), which is written
in terns of total and partial loss of use of specified "members" of the body such as hands,
fingers, toes, and the like-none of which would be covered under LA. R.S. 23:1221(4)(p)
as written.
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is probably the next significant change worked by the 1983 amendments
worthy of discussion. One should note at the outset that the legislative.
choice is not for an industrial commission patterned after the state Civil
Service Commission or the Public Service Commission, with an appeal
on the record to a court of appeal. Rather, the legislature chose simply
to add an additional level of dispute resolution at the beginning of the
process, and it provided that this level was non-binding, with either party
free to reject the recommendation of this informal arbitrator. And, what
is even more curious, the recommendation which the arbitrator makes
is inadmissible in the later judicial proceedings.
Proceedings Before the Director
Act 1 of the 1983 Extraordinary Session created the office of state
worker's compensation administration, headed by a director. It established
that office as the initial point in the process of dispute resolution, and
the director as the arbiter of those disputes.
The director has a panoply of administrative powers and duties not
particularly pertinent here, including direction of the office, appointment
of personnel, requirement of filing of safety plans, promulgation of rules
and forms, and the like."0 The actual process of dispute resolution begins
when the employer is required to report to its insurer (if any) and to
the director an injury resulting in death or in the lost time in excess of
one week after the injury. This report must be made within ten days of
actual knowledge of the injury and is to be made on a form provided
by the director. All the information required to be provided is confiden-
tial and is not subject to subpoena." Upon receipt of that information
from the employer, the director is required to send "immediately" to the
injured employee a brochure explaining the employee's potential rights
under the Act and the functions of his office."
Thereafter, if "at any time" a "bona fide dispute" occurs concern-
ing a death or injury resulting in excess of seven days lost time, either
the employee, his dependent, the employer, or the insurer may file a claim
with the director. 3 The director is then required to "evaluate" the claim
and, within thirty days, to issue a recommendation. The recommendation
is said to be "advisory only" and is not admissible in any subsequent
proceeding."
Filing with the director tolls the prescriptive periods contained in Loui-
70. LA. R.S. 23:1291-:1293 (Supp. 1984).
71. LA. R.S. 23:1306(B) (Supp. 1984).
72. The more cynical may see this as an effort to keep the worker from contacting
an attorney concerning his rights under the Act.
73. LA. R.S. 23:1310 (Supp. 1984).
74. LA. R.S. 23:1310.1 (Supp. 1984).
1984]
LOUISIANA LA W REVIEW
siana Revised Statutes 23:1209, now tolled by filing with the district court.
.Presumably, this is applicable to all of the various time periods in section
1209, and no other substantive change is intended.
Within thirty days after receipt of the recommendation, each party
must notify the director of acceptance or rejection of the recommenda-
tion. As a practical matter, only notice of rejection has any significance.
A party is presumed to have accepted the recommendation if notice of
rejection is not received within the allotted thirty days." If the recom-
mendation is timely rejected, the director issues a certificate showing that
fact, though the certificate does not reveal what the recommendation was
nor who the rejecting party or parties were. At that point, the employee
or his dependent is free to proceed in the proper district court.
One hesitates to criticize any genuine effort at resolution of disputes
without formal litigation. But as drafted, the foregoing procedure con-
tains a number of troubling aspects. The requirement that the director
evaluate each claim and issue a recommendation within thirty days is totally
unrealistic. It is impossible to have a staff large enough to make any kind
of meaningful recommendation within thirty days after receipt of very
basic information such as that required by the amended Act. It may have
been envisioned that the director evaluate the claims without hearings,
but if he does hold hearings, the thirty-day period for issuance of a recom-
mendation will almost certainly be violated.
The conclusive presumption of acceptance of the recommendation if
a party does not respond could work an injustice in the case of a worker
without counsel. If the worker is provided with the necessary forms to
make a claim by his employer and does so (in part because he will be
told that he has to file a claim with the director if he wants to file one
at all), he will be the one who receives the recommendation. At his peril,
he must digest the recommendation and decide whether he will accept
or reject it, all within a thirty-day period. Such deciphering of paperwork
and prompt response to deadlines may be commonplace for experienced
employers and insurers with computer-aided retrieval systems, but for the
uninitiated injured worker the same is not necessarily the case.
The requirement that the director's recommendation be "kept secret"
is puzzling. The trial court's ruling is not kept secret in an ordinary appeal.
Indeed, one is justifiably interested in what the trial court thought of
the case. Perhaps the legislature believed that a district court would treat
the matter as if it were an appeal and refuse to overturn the director's
recommendation absent manifest error. If so, that could clearly have been
prohibited in the amendments. The remedy of keeping the director's recom-
mendation a secret is much too broad for that evil.
75. LA. R.S. 23:1310.1 (Supp. 1984).
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And if the director's investigation and potential hearings are never
to be revealed, there will be a considerable duplication of effort at the
district court level. The procedure at the level of the director and the
subseqient treatment of his recommendation reduce him to little more
than an involuntary, but non-binding, arbitrator.
Amended Provisions for Filing in District Court
To reflect the establishment of the office of the director of worker's
compensation, Act I amended the provisions for the initial filing of a
petition in the district court. If the director's recommendation is rejected
by any party, the employee or his dependent must file a petition with
the appropriate civil district court within sixty days of receipt of the recom-
mendation or within the period established by Louisiana Revised Statutes
23:1209, whichever occurs last. Thus, the claimant has the full benefit
of the time periods established by that section as judicially interpreted,
and he may have an even longer time if the sixty-day period after receipt
of the recommendation would expire after that period. Under the prior
provisions of Louisiana Revised Statutes 23:1311, either the employee or
the employer had the right to file a petition with the district court. Under
the amended provisions, only the employee has that specific right.
Theoretically, an employer could have rejected the director's recommen-
dation but be powerless to file a petition for a declaratory judgment.
Presumably, the employer would decline to pay the employee and thus
provoke that employee's lawsuit under this provision.
But if the dispute is over the employee's failure to undergo a medical
examination, and the employee rejects the director's recommendation that
he do so, what remedy does the employer have? The amended section
does not appear to envision that situation.
The venue provisions found in section 1311 as amended in 1980 are
retained, and they include the parish of the domicile of the employee or
his dependent.
The requirement that the petition be verified is continued,7 6 and some
additional specific requirements are made with respect to the contents of
the petition. It must set forth: (1) the names and addresses of the parties;
(2) a statement of the time, place, nature and cause of the injury, or
equivalent information to put the employer on notice; (3) the specific
benefits claimed to be due but not being paid or provided; and (4) a state-
ment that the claim has been submitted to the director, but that the attempt
at resolution failed.7" The petition must also contain a certificate from
the-director showing that his recommendation has been rejected, although
76. But the answer need no longer be verified. LA. R.S. 23:1315 (Supp. 1984).
77. LA. R.S. 23:1311(B)( Supp. 1984).
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the certificate is not to contain either the content of the recommendation
or the identity of the party or parties which rejected it.7"
The requirement that the petition contain a certificate from the direc-
tor showing that his recommendation has been rejected thus becomes part
of the consideration of whether the petition is premature. Absent that
certificate, the petition "shall be dismissed." 9
The language of the dismissal section may be firm enough to prevent
the parties from circumventing the office of the director. In theory, if
the claimant and the employer or insurer did not want to pursue the "in-
formal resolution" procedure offered by the director, they could agree
that the claimant would file his lawsuit in the appropriate district court
and the defendant would answer, thus waiving the plea of prematurity
under article 928 of the Code of Civil Procedure. A court not willing
to tolerate such a procedure could either note on its own motion that
it did not have subject matter jurisdiction, 0 or that the clear mandate
of section 1314 required it to dismiss the petition because it lacked the
certificate of rejection of the director's recommendation. How a court
might be inclined to rule on such maneuvers may depend heavily upon
the court's impression of how efficient the director's office seems to be.
If there are great delays, it may be in the best interest of the claimant
to permit him to bypass the procedure if he and the defendant agree to
do so.
Modification of Awards by Director
The 1983 amendments made some minor changes in Louisiana Re-
vised Statutes 23:1331 concerning modification of a judgment by consent
of the parties, essentially to reflect the role of the office of the director
as the tribunal of first instance. A judgment rendered by the district court
may now be modified by agreement of all parties "with the approval of
the director or, in the event the director refuses to so approve, by a judge
of the district court which rendered the same." 8 All such modifications
are subject to the provisions of Louisiana Revised Statutes 23:1271-:1274
relative to compromises and lump sum settlements.2
If the director approves a modification, the approved agreement must
78. LA. R.S. 23:1310.1 (Supp. 1984).
79. LA. R.S. 23:1314 (Supp. 1984).
80. LA. CODE CIV. P. arts. 2, 3, 925.
81. LA. R.S. 23:1331 (Supp. 1984).
82. LA. R.S. 23:1271 now contains the provision that a compromise or lump sum settle-
ment may not be confected until six months after termination of temporary total disability.
Reference to that section in LA. R.S. 23:1331 could place a limitation on the right to review
and modification in a few instances.
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be forwarded to the clerk of court for the parish in which the judgment
was originally rendered for filing. Upon filing, the agreement "shall
become" the judgment of the district court.8 3
If the parties do not agree that a modification is in order, a pro-
cedure for review similar to that prior to the 1983 amendments exists.
Six months after rendition of judgment, or six months after the date the
parties have accepted the director's recommendation, the director "shall
review" the judgment or recommendation upon the application of either
party.8 ' He may then issue a new recommendation under Louisiana Revised
Statutes 23:1310.1.85 Though the amended provision does not so provide
specifically, this new recommendation presumably is subject to the ordinary
review process in the judicial system.
The amendments delete from Louisiana Revised Statutes 23:1331 the
requirement that a party seeking review allege that the "incapacity of the
employee has been subsequently diminished or increased, or that the judg-
ment was obtained through error, fraud, or misrepresentation."
Presumably, this omission makes the precise reason for the modification
request irrelevant.
Louisiana Revised Statutes 23:1331(D) provides that the modification
procedure "shall not apply to the calculation of" SEB. The precise im-
port of this statement is unclear. Surely it cannot mean that when a
worker's post-injury wages decrease from what they were at the time of
a recommendation or judgment, he has no right to seek an increase in
SEB against a recalcitrant employer. The same should be said of the right
of the employer to seek a decrease in SEB if the worker's post-injury
wages increase.8 6 Perhaps this provision is meant only to say that no for-
mal modification is required when post-injury wages increase or decrease;
upon proper proof, the parties should be able to agree upon the changes.
Since this subsection refers only to the "calculation" of SEB, a worker
could still seek modification to change his benefits from SEB to total
and permanent disability in the event that his condition changes to that
extent.
83. LA. R.S. 23:1331(B) (Supp. 1984).
84. LA. R.S. 23:1331(C) (Supp. 1984).
85. This is a novel proposition. There are very few instances, if any, in which a final
judgment of a district court may be reviewed and modified by an administrative officer.
Perhaps the possibility of further review in the judicial system is a sufficient protection,
but this approach is nonetheless unusual.
86. If this subsection does mean that there can be no review after the appropriate monthly
benefit is once fixed, such a result is entirely inconsistent with the continuing-subsidy notion
of supplemental earnings benefits and the concept of wage-loss benefits as a measure of
loss of capacity.
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Role of the Director in Approving Settlements and Compromises
With respect to both a lump sum settlement and a compromise, the
amendments to Louisiana Revised Statutes 23:1271 now express the com-
mendable policy that it is "in the best interest of the injured worker to
receive benefit payments on a periodic basis" as he had received his wages.
In light of that policy, a lump sum settlement or compromise in exchange
for a release of the employer or the insurer is permitted only when three
requisites are met: (1) the parties must agree, including specifically a duty
upon the insurer to obtain the employer's consent; (2) it must be
demonstrated that the lump sum payment is clearly in the best interests
"of the parties"; and (3) six months must have elapsed after termination
of temporary total disability.
If these requisites are met, the parties may petition the director for
approval of a compromise or a lump sum settlement. In the case of a
compromise, all parties must sign a joint petition to the director for
approval; the petition must be verified by the employee or his dependent. 7
The director is required to "determine" whether the employee understands
the compromise and may hold a hearing for that purpose. Presumably,
this language is intended to depart from the present requirement that a
district judge must "discuss" the compromise with the employee in every
case, and thus probably is intended to overrule cases invalidating com-
promises not effected after such discussion. 8 How the director will "deter-
mine" that the employee understands the compromise is left unsaid, but
undoubtedly the employee does not have the same protection under the
revised system as he did under the system in which the district judge was
required to "discuss" the compromise with him. One of the director's
promulgated rules requires that the joint petition include a "statement
of how the compromise settlement will provide substantial justice to all
parties," including the reason for the compromise and "what benefit the
injured employee will receive as a result" of the settlement. 9
The amended section no longer contains limitations on what types
of issues may be compromised, as did the former section. The previous
wording had been so broadly interpreted, however, that this change is
not likely to accomplish any substantive change in the law.
If the director finds that the compromise accomplishes substantial
justice between the parties, he is to approve it "by order." His order
is then not subject to annulment or modification except by a proper district
court upon a showing of fraud or misrepresentation made or induced by
the employer or insurer.8 0 This is a standard in the prior law.
87. LA. R.S. 23:1272 (Supp. 1984).
88. Smith v. Cajun Insulation, Inc., 392 So. 2d 398 (La. 1980).
89. LA. DEP'T OF LABOR, OFFICE OF WORKER'S COMPENSATION ADMIN. R. LWC-23.
90. LA. R.S. 23:1272(B) (Supp. 1984).
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If the director refuses to approve the compromise, the parties may
present the compromise to the proper district court,9 again in a joint
petition verified by the employee or his dependent. The district judge is
then to "determine" whether the employee understands the compromise.
Again, the specific requirement that he "discuss" the compromise with
the employee is deleted.
Also deleted is the requirement that the court appoint an attorney
to advise the claimant, if he does not have one. This relatively minor
protection for the claimant should have been retained. The director's office
will probably be unable to perform the same function as this appointed
attorney has performed in the past. If there were worries that the ap-
pointed attorney would do nothing other than advise rejection of the com-
promise and foment litigation, the solution is to make the compromise
fair rather than to eliminate the advisor. Moreover, in some parishes the
existence of these minor curator fees for young attorneys has been the
inducement to take indigent criminal defense appointments, and some dif-
ferent scheme might have to be devised to keep that system functioning.
If the court approves the compromise, then it too cannot be set aside
except upon a showing of fraud or misrepresentation induced or made
by the employer or insurer."
No major changes were made in the lump sum settlement provisions."
Such settlements are first to be presented to the director under the existing
limits on the rate of discount and penalties for discounts deeper than that
rate. The amendments do, however, delete the prohibition against
agreements to settle schedule losses and death claims for terms shorter
than those listed in the statute as well as the provision authorizing the
use of a mortality table to calculate lump sum settlement in total dis-
ability cases. Presumably, the parties will be free to reach whatever agree-
ment they wish in these matters, but how will it be determined in a total
disability case that only a proper discount rate has been used? The dis-
count rate cannot be calculated unless one knows what the full amount
payable would have been.
Miscellaneous Procedural Changes
There are some additional procedural changes of minor importance.
Amendments to Louisiana Revised Statutes 23:1312, relative to venue for
suits against public boards, commissions, and agencies, delete the domicile
91. LA. R.S. 23:1273(A) (Supp. 1984). The venue provisions are retained after the amend-
ments: parish of the domicile or principal place of business of the defendant, parish where
the accident occurred, or parish of the domicile of the employee or his dependent, all at
the option of the employee or his dependent. LA. R.S. 23:1311(A) (Supp. 1984).
92. LA. R.S. 23:1273(B) (Supp. 1984).
93. LA. R.S. 23:1274 (Supp. 1984).
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of the defendant as a proper venue and add as a proper venue the district
court of the parish in which the injury occurred. The amendments also
delete the phrase "as it existed at the time of the accident or injury on
which the suit is based" as a modifier of the domicile of the employee,
thus leaving open the question of whether a dependent seeking death
benefits may sue at his own domicile. Service must be made on the presi-
dent or chairman of the defendant public body, or upon any other officer
authorized by law to accept service.
Further amendments to section 1312 add to the Louisiana Nineteenth
Judicial District Court (East Baton Rouge Parish) as a proper venue for
actions against the state, the district court of the domicile of the employee
and the district court of the parish in which the injury occurred. Service
still must be made both on the governor and on the attorney general.
The venue provision is inartfully drawn; what if the suit is against the
state, but the plaintiff is the dependent of a deceased employee? Is venue
proper in the domicile of the dependent?
Prior to the 1983 amendments, Louisiana Revised Statutes 23:1315
required the fixing of a hearing date upon the filing of a petition in district
court not less than three weeks after the date of service. As amended,
the section retains that provision and adds "nor more than six weeks"
after service.
Louisiana Revised Statutes 23:1318, relative to the taking of deposi-
tions, was renumbered 1319 by the amendments, and its substance was
altered slightly. It now provides that any party may take a deposition
(except of the director or his employees, forbidden under amended sec-
tion 1318), but only after the receipt of the recommendation of the direc-
tor. This provision may work a hardship in an exceptional case in which
testimony needs to be preserved, and there appears to be no important
reason to deny completely the right to take a deposition prior to the direc-
tor's recommendation. Upon a proper showing under article 1429 of the
Code of Civil Procedure, the court would probably have the power to
order the deposition before receipt of the recommendation despite this
amended provision.
Finally, Louisiana Revised Statutes 23:1123, concerning medical
examinations, was amended to place the choice of a physician "if any
dispute arises as to the condition of the employee" in the director. If
he should refuse to make the choice, the court is then entitled to make it.
COMPROMISE WITH ALLEGED TORTFEASOR
Next in order of importance among the amendments are the new pro-
visions relating to compromise of pending tort claims. Important conse-
quences may follow such a compromise, either for the employee or for
the tortfeasor himself. Act 1 amended Louisiana Revised Statute 23:1102
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to deal specifically with the decision in Crabtree v. Bethlehem Steel Corp.,"'
imposing severe sanctions upon the employee and the tortfeasor in order
to protect the employer's right to reimbursement of compensation already
paid or due in the future. These amendments were not in the 1981 or
1982 proposals, and were reportedly added at the insistence of one par-
ticular group in the employer community.
The provisions of subsection 1102(A) were retained; the amendment
simply added to the subsection the insurer as a potential plaintiff against
a "third person." Thus either the employee, his dependent, or the employer
or the insurer who initiates litigation against a third person must notify
the others that he has done so, and the others may then intervene.
The provisions of subsections 1102(B) and (C) are new, and they attack
the problem of settlement with the third person from two different angles.
The first, in subsection 1102(B), concerns the consequences for an employee
who settles with the third person without the employer's consent. The
second, in subsection 1102(C), concerns the consequences for the third
person who settles an employee's action without the employer's consent.
An employee who settles with "such third person" is entitled to con-
tinue to receive compensation from his employer or the insurer in excess
of the amount recovered9 "only if written approval of such compromise
is obtained from the employer or insurer""' contemporaneous with or prior
to the compromise. If the employee (1) fails to notify the employer or
insurer of the institution of suit or (2) fails to obtain the necessary written
approval of the compromise from the employer and insurer, the employee
forfeits the right to "future compensation, including medical expenses.""
The employee who runs afoul of this provision has only one escape. He
94. 284 So. 2d 545 (La. 1973), discussed in W. MALONE & A. JOHNSON, supra note
2, § 373.
95. Is the "amount recovered" the net amount the employee has received from the
compromise after paying his attorney, or is it the total amount of the compromise? This
is a matter of some significance. Some opinion has been expressed that it should be the
total amount of the compromise, i.e., that the employer is entitled to a credit for whatever
the compromise is. While this is a possible interpretation, it is not in accord with the more
reasonable meaning of the words "amount recovered." The employee "recovers" only the
amount that he walks away with, not an amount that he shares with his lawyer. The legislature
could easily have used the phrase "total amount recovered" which it used elsewhere in
the subsection if it meant the total amount of the compromise. Cf. Landry v. Carlson Mooring
Serv., 643 F.2d 1080 (5th Cir. 1981) (credit that employer got from payments under state
law against Longshoremen's aid Harbor Workers' Compensation Act responsibility was
the net amount that the employee received, not the gross amount prior to deduction of
his attorney fee).
96. LA. R.S. 23:1102(B) (Supp. 1984) (emphasis added).
97. LA. R.S. 23:1102(B) (Supp. 1984). The phrasing of this provision indicates that
it is intended to reach payments due between the filing of suit and settlement, as well as
that after settlement.
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may in essence "buy back" the right to future compensation by paying
to the employer or insurer "the total amount of compensation benefits,
medical benefits, attorney's fees, and penalties, previously paid to or on
behalf of the employee, exclusive of attorney's fees arising out of the
compromise."98 This "buy back" is subject to a ceiling, however: "[In
no event shall the amount paid to the employer or insurer exceed fifty
percent of the total amount recovered from the compromise. '
Although the general thrust of this amendment is clear, some of the
details are not. It is clearly intended to strengthen the employer's hand
when the possibility of a recovery against a tortfeasor exists, and when
the possibility ends in settlement rather than judgment.
Prior consent to settlement is supposed to be obtained. Here the first
point of confusion appears. The employee preserves his right to future com-
pensation if he obtains written approval of his compromise with the tort-
feasor from "the employer or insurer." However, the employee who fails
to obtain written approval of the "employer and insurer" will forfeit the
right to future compensation. This can only mean that the approval of both
is required. Read together, one must conclude that absent the approval of
the employer (regardless of the insurer's agreement), the right to future com-
pensation will be forfeited. This provision is poorly drafted, and the precise
meaning should be clarified at the first opportunity.
The "buy back" provision also has a very disturbing aspect. In order
to preserve his right, the claimant must reimburse the "total amount" of
weekly benefits, medical benefits, attorney fees, and penalties previously paid
to or on behalf of the employee. With respect to weekly benefits and medical
benefits, this is entirely understandable and restates present law under Loui-
siana Revised Statutes 23:1103 as to judgments. But can this mean that if
an employer or insurer dragged its feet so substantially on the initial com-
pensation claim that it incurred penalties and attorney fees, the employee
must reimburse these as well out of his settlement?"'
To illustrate the point, assume that the worker was forced to litigate
his compensation claim and ultimately received a judgment for $20,000.00
in weekly benefits, $10,000.00 in medical benefits and $5,000.00 in attorney
fees and penalties due to behavior under the amended provisions suffi-
cient to cause the imposition of such sanctions. If the language of subsec-
tion 1102(B) means what it says, the employee who settles a pending tort
action without employer consent must reimburse the employer for the
$30,000.00 in benefits and the $5,000.00 in penalties and attorney fees
98. LA. R.S. 23:1102(B) (Supp. 1984).
99. LA. R.S. 23:1102(B) (Supp. 1984).
100. This seems the only plausible interpretation. The only "attorney's fees and penalties"
paid to the employee would be those under the Act, and they would only be payable by
the employer or the insurer.
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in order to preserve his right to future compensation. Thus, the employee
in effect returns to the employer the statutory penalty for the employer's
conduct. This seems grossly unfair, if that is indeed the intent of the
language.
The repayment provision, subsection 1102(B), is also afflicted with
a dangling modifier:
[The] right to future compensation in excess of the amount
recovered from the compromise shall be reserved upon payment
to the employer or insurer of the total amount of compensation
benefits, medical benefits, attorney's fees, and penalties, previously
paid to or on behalf of the employee, exclusive of attorney's fees
arising out of the compromise .... 101
The only sensible meaning of that phrase is as a modifier of "the amount
recovered from the compromise" rather than of the clause which it im-
mediately follows. If the employee, for example, settles for $20,000.00
and realizes only $15,000.00 of that amount because he pays his attorney
$5,000.00 as a contingent fee, only the $15,000.00 would be the "amount
recovered from the compromise." Thus, if he properly "buys back" his
right to future compensation payments, the right to those payments com-
mences when $15,000.00 is due to him rather than when $20,000.00 is
due.
The subsection contains one other important provision. The amount
of any "buy back" of future rights is limited to fifty percent of the "total
amount recovered from the compromise." Here again there is ambiguity.
Suppose that the employee above has been paid $11,000.00 in compensa-
tion benefits and must "buy back" that amount to preserve future com-
pensation rights. If the fifty percent limit is literally applied to the total
amount of the settlement itself, then he must reimburse $10,000.00 (50%
of $20,000.00) of the employer's expenditure. If the fifty percent limit
is applied to the amount he actually "recovered" from the compromise,
then he must reimburse $7,500.00 (50% of $15,000.00) to preserve his
future rights. The latter seems to be the preferable interpretation. If the
former interpretation is chosen, the employee will have wholly borne the
legal expenses of an action which benefits both the employee and the
employer. The latter interpretation forces the employer and employee to
share that legal cost by taking fifty percent of a figure reduced by a legal
fee.
Louisiana Revised Statutes 23:1102(C) imposes restrictions upon the
tortfeasor as well. If "the third party defendant or his insurer" does not
obtain written approval of a compromise with the employee from the
employer or his insurer, and if the employee does not "buy back" his
101. Emphasis added.
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rights through the reimbursement procedure discussed above, then the
"third party defendant or his insurer shall be required to reimburse the
employer or his insurer" to the extent of the total amount which other-
wise should have been reimbursed by the employee.' °2 One reading of
this provision, and probably the more plausible one, is that it imposes
the extreme sanction upon the tortfeasor who settles without the employer's
consent. He waives his defense on the merits of the tort claim, and finds
that he automatically owes reimbursement to the employer simply because
the statute says that he does. This reading seems harsh, but certainly it
will tend to defeat settlements by the tortfeasor without employer con-
sent. Constitutional arguments against such a sanction would be
plausible.' 03
Difficult cases may arise. What if a tortfeasor settles in ignorance
of the fact that a compensation claim might have been involved, and there
are no facts from which he should reasonably have known that it was
a possibility? Will the same sanction apply? Do the same rules apply before
a tortfeasor becomes a "third party defendant"? Previous subsection
1102(B), and indeed the rest of the Act, talk about a "third person."
If the language of this subsection is taken literally, it applies only when
a tortfeasor has become a third-party defendant. A court which was not
particularly fond of this subsection could do considerable damage to it
by reading it literally. In the ordinary course of events, a tortfeasor rarely
becomes a third-party defendant in these matters. The employee sues in
tort, the employer or carrier intervenes, and the tortfeasor is a defendant
on the main demand. Even when the employer sues to enforce its own
claim for reimbursement, the tortfeasor is not a "third party defendant.""'
Another possibility is that the court could interpret this subsection
to have no application to a tortfeasor who never becomes a defendant,
third party or otherwise. If the employee simply negotiates a settlement
with the tortfeasor without ever bringing a suit, then arguably this subsec-
tion never comes into play.
This subsection also contains the objectionable provision that the reim-
102. Subsection 1102(C) continues:
Notwithstanding said reimbursement, all rights of the employer or his insurer to
assert the defense provided for herein against claims for future compensation by
the employee or his dependent shall be reserved. Nothing herein shall be inter-
preted to affect the rights of the employer or his insurer to otherwise seek reim-
bursement for compensation benefits, medical benefits, attorney's fees, or penalties
against a third party defendant or his insurer without regard to the actions of
the employee on whose behalf said compensation and medical benefits were paid.
103. Can due process of law be preserved by denying a hearing on the merits of the
tort claim to the tortfeasor simply because he engages in the ordinarily favored process
of settlement of a different claim without litigation?
104. LA. CODE CiV. P. arts. 1111-1116.
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bursement to be paid to the employer must include the amount of attorney
fees and penalties which might have been paid to the employee. This casts
the sanction for the employer's conduct onto the tortfeasor, who has no
control over the employer's conduct, without demonstrable reason why
this should be the case. This also seems inconsistent with an analogous
new provision in the penalty section prohibiting an insurance policy from
covering penalties if a court determines that the employer should pay the
penalty.'0 5
Whatever else may be said of the new provisions in Louisiana Re-
vised Statutes 23:1102, a significant restructuring of the three-sided rela-
tionship between employee, employer, and tortfeasor has been made.
TREATMENT OF PART-TIME EMPLOYEES
Specific Legislative Provisions for Part-Time Employees
Act 1 added provisions to the definition of "wages" under Louisiana
Revised Statutes 23:1021 specifically to govern the problems of part-time
employees. The effect of the amendments is to overrule the jurispruden-
tial position that a part-time employee is entitled to compensation on the
basis of wages that he would have earned if he had been employed full
time at his work. In other words, the judicial choice of earning capacity
over actual earnings is rejected in the case of part-time employees.
In a new subsection numbered 1021(9), a part-time employee is defined
as a person who "as a condition of his hiring knowingly accepts employ-
ment that (a) customarily provides for less than forty hours per work
week, and (b) that is classified by the employer as a part-time position."
This of course describes a position which is part-time at the designation
of the employer rather than at the discretion of the employee. This latter
situation is also provided for in subsection 1021(10)(a)(ii), which reads:
If the employee is paid on an hourly basis and the employee
was offered employment for forty hours or more but regularly,
and at his own discretion, works less than forty hours per week
for whatever reason, then, the average of his total earnings per
week for the four full weeks preceding the date of the accident
[shall be his average weekly wage].
These amendments appear to produce a mixed blessing. Certainly they
will be a great boon to some employers, who will no longer have to pay
compensation premiums for part-time employees on the basis of
hypothetical full-time wages, as undoubtedly has been the case in the past.
Employers should be careful to define part-time status of certain employees
and establish some procedure to satisfy the criterion that the employee
has "knowingly" taken a part-time job.
105. LA. R.S. 23:1201(E) (Supp. 1984).
1984]
LOUISIANA LA W REVIEW
But the amendments could prove to be a serious detriment to protec-
tion of the earning capacity of the part-time employee. A good number
of persons in the work force "moonlight" at a second job (usually part-
time) in order to make ends meet in difficult economic times. The worker
who is injured in his part-time job will be just as disabled as if he had
been injured in the same way in his full-time job. The effect on his earn-
ing capacity will probably be the same, despite the fact that his part-time
job rather than his full-time job produced the effect on his earning capa-
city. Due to the unfortunate fact that the mishap is within his part-time
job, however, the benefits intended to restore partially his earning capacity
will be significantly less.
A simple example will suffice. A clerical employee works a full forty-
hour work week in an office, earning $300.00 per week. She "moonlights"
as a clerk in a retail store in the evenings and on weekends, working
twenty hours and earning $100.00 per week. If she slips and hurts her
back in her full-time job and is temporarily totally disabled for six months,
she would be entitled to two thirds of $300.00, or $200.00 per week in
benefits. That in itself would be a substantial reduction from the $400.00
per week she made at the two jobs. But if she has the misfortune to
slip and hurt her back in the same manner at her part-time job rather
than her full-time job, she would be entitled to two thirds of $100.00,
or $66.67 per week.' °6
A loss of earning capacity is of paramount importance to the
employee. Although true, it is harsh to tell an employee that it is just
his tough luck that he lost his complete earning capacity in his part-time
job rather than his full-time job. The new provisions imply potential
punishment for industrious workers who try to hold more than one job.
Neither the legislature nor the judiciary has ever tried to force an
employer to pay an employee for more than a forty-hour work week (in
modern times), unless the employer has by his own choice assigned more
hours per week to that employee with his own consent. This is consistent
with the underlying policy that the Act is not a wage-protection plan,
but rather a protection of earning capacity up to a certain level. The most
disturbing thing about the amendments is that they depart from the policy
of protecting earning capacity and adhere to a sort of minimum wage
replacement scheme. The change will save some employers some money.
But the money thereby saved by the employers may be cast upon the
general taxpaying public for medical expenses and perhaps public assistance
for the hapless employee who suffers disabling injury in his part-time job
rather than his full-time job.
106. These calculations are not based on the supplemental earnings benefits section and
its formula (74% of the difference between 90% of the old wage and the new wage). These
are temporary total disability benefits at a simple two thirds of prior wage.
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Common sense dictates that workers who now hold part-time jobs
will not weigh these alternatives and then decide to give up their part-
time employment because of the risk that they may lose their earning
capacity without the ordinary remedy for that loss. Thus, the part-time
employee is likely always to be a problem. Thus one must consider whether
society's best interests are served by these amendments, which depart from
the long-standing principle of protection of earning capacity in order to
serve the interest of certain employers who regularly hire part-time
employees.
There may also be some difficulty in interpreting the provisions relating
to employees who are offered full-time employment but choose to work
fewer hours. The Act now calls for calculation of their wages at actual
hours worked if the employee "regularly, and at his own discretion" works
fewer than forty hours. It is unclear what the word "regularly" means
in this context. If, in the critical four weeks preceding injury, the employee
took a few hours off for sick leave or annual leave, this should not be
considered "regularly" working fewer than forty hours. He should be
entitled to calculation on the basis of his ordinary forty-hour work week.
On the other hand, if he takes a job which is nominally a forty-hour-a-
week job but consistently conducts himself so that he works only thirty-
five hours in a week, then perhaps his wages should be calculated under
this provision. He should not be able to convert a full-time job (for which
the employer is paying premiums on that basis) to a part-time job with
full protection of wage earning capacity, at least not without the employer's
consent. The employer may well want a genuine full-time employee pro-
tection. But, of course, this is a matter which the employer can control
for himself. If he wants a full-time employee and has one in the position
who "regularly and at his own discretion" works fewer hours, that
employee can be terminated. The legislation on that point seems largely
unnecessary.
On balance, the legislative amendments relative to part-time employees
seem unwise as written, and the detrimental effect of departure from the
principle of protection of earning capacity seems to outweigh the benefits
gained by certain employers.' 7
107. The amendments will also have an impact on the problem of successive employ-
ment. It was suggested by Professor Malone and this writer, W. MALONE & A. JOHNSON,
supra note 2, § 325, that for successive employment situations, a worker should at least
be entitled to calculation based upon loss of full (forty hours) earning capacity in the job
in which he was injured, regardless of whether that job happened to be for fewer than
forty hours a week. This suggestion was simply an extension of the concept of protection
of full earning capacity for part-time employees to a situation in which the injured worker
held successive employments.
But since the legislature by its amendments to LA. R.S. 23:1021(10)(a) has specifically
provided that part-time employees are not entitled to calculation upon a hypothetical full-
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REDUCTION WHEN OTHER BENEFITS ARE PAYABLE
Act 1 revised the statutory provisions relating to reduction of com-
pensation when other benefits are payable. In 1978, the legislature had
amended the Act to take advantage of the federal statutory provision per-
mitting a reduction in state compensation payments when those payments
coupled with social security payments would amount to more than the
federal maximum.1"8 Such a reduction placed a greater burden on the
federal system than on the state compensation payor. 1°9
In light of other duplicative provisions, further legislative action would
very likely be required. That further action occurred in 1983. Like the
Florida source provision,'" Louisiana Revised Statutes 23:1225(B) was
amended to provide that no compensation benefits (whether for total
disability or SEB payments) shall be payable for any week in which the
employee has received unemployment compensation benefits."' The Florida
statute goes on to provide that if an employee is entitled to both unemploy-
ment and wage-loss (SEB) payments, the former "shall be primary" and
wage-loss benefits shall be payable only in amounts necessary to make
up the total of wage-loss benefits which would otherwise be due."' Absence
of this provision from the Louisiana statute suggests that the payment
of any amount of unemployment compensation benefits would entirely
defeat the payment of any SEB payments, which seems inexplicably un-
fair.
time calculation, this suggestion cannot be applicable. If the employee works part-time in
each of his successive employments, the undesirable result envisioned by the court in King
v. American Tank & Equip. Corp., 144 So. 283 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1932) (worker employed
daily for six days at six different jobs would have benefits calculated on basis of daily
wage per week of one working day; such could not be the "purpose of the law") will
obtain. These amendments eliminate the problem of potential "aggregation" of wages to
reach a full-time figure, but they cause serious problems by removing the protection of
full earning capacity from part-time workers. See W. MALONE & A. JOHNSON, supra note
2, § 322 (Supp. 1984).
108. W. MALONE & A. JOHNSON, supra note 2, § 289.
109. The 1983 amendments add to these provisions the statement: "However, there shall
be no reduction in benefits provided under this Section for the cost-of-living increases granted
under the federal law after the date of the employee's injury." LA. R.S. 23:1225(A),(Supp.
1984).
110. FLA. STAT. ANN. § 440.15(11)(a) (West 1981).
111. Subsection 1225(B) continues: "[E]xcept as provided for in R.S. 23:1601(7)(b)."
This appears nonsensical, since LA. R.S. 23:1601(7)(b) provides that a person is ineligible
for unemployment compensation in any week in which he receives workmen's compensa-
tion. If literally interpreted, the worker could receive neither unemployment compensation
because he "is receiving" workers' compensation, nor workers' compensation because he
"is receiving" unemployment compensation. One reasonable interpretation, in light of the
manner in which LA. R.S. 23:1225(B) is drafted, is that the worker should receive the full
workers'. compensation benefit, since he presumably would not receive any unemployment
compensation under LA. R.S. 23:1601(7)(b).
112. FLA. STAT. ANN. § 440.15(1l)(b) (West 1981).
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Amended section 1225 provides a sort of state maximum on such
payments. If an employee is receiving "remuneration" from (a) Louisiana
workers' compensation, (b) old-age insurance benefits under social security
to the extent not funded by the employee, (c) disability benefits under
a private plan in the proportion funded by the employer, and (d) any
other workers' compensation benefits,"' 3 then his Louisiana compensation
benefits are reduced to the extent necessary to limit him to two thirds
of his average weekly wage at the time of injury." 4 He and the employer
may agree to the contrary, and the reduction of benefits provisions do
not apply when he receives benefits under the Louisiana Act "or any other
laws" for "injury or death sustained by another person. ' 15
The final amendment to section 1225 concerns the frequent overlap
between state workers' compensation and "any federally enacted worker's
compensation law" (presumably the Longshoremen's and Harbor Workers'
Compensation Act (LHWCA)). The amended language seems internally
inconsistent, but there is probably a method to such madness. The amend-
ment appears to be an attempt to provide a two-way bar to successive
recoveries, one by magic words that will lead into case law and the other
by a specific legislative statement.
The entire background scenario is too lengthy to repeat here. The
plot concerns successive compensation awards to injured employees, either
first in one state and then another, or first in a state and then the LHWCA
(or vice versa). The early acts may be reviewed elsewhere. ' 16 Briefly, in
Magnolia Petroleum Co. v. Hunt,"' the United States Supreme Court
held that a Louisiana court had to give final effect to a Texas compensa-
tion adjudication of the injured worker's rights even though the Loui-
siana remedy would have been more favorable. The Texas provision was
held to provide for exclusivity, though it was a rather broad and com-
monplace statement of exclusivity as to common law remedies against the
employer. Several years later, in Industrial Commission v. McCartin,"8
the same court reached a different conclusion (permitting successive awards)
under an Illinois statute which was only superficially different from the
Texas statute. In McCartin, the Supreme Court preserved a very narrow
113. What will happen if another state has a similar provision, and wants to reduce
those benefits by the amount which is paid under the Louisiana statute?
114. LA. R.S. 23:1225(C)(1) (Supp. 1984). Presumably, the credit would be 50076 of any
social security payment, and would vary according to the amount of a private disability
plan funded by the employer.
115. LA. R.S. 23:1225(Cj(2) (Supp. 1984). If an individual receiving compensation
payments for his own injury is also dependent upon another person, and that person is
killed in a compensable accident, the payments made to the first person would not cause
a reduction in benefits.
116. See W. MALONE & A. JOHNSON, supra note 2, § 409.
117. 320 U.S. 430 (1943).
118. 330 U.S. 622 (1947).
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application for Magnolia: if a state statute contained "unmistakable
language" making its remedy exclusive, then Magnolia would control and
another state could not grant a successive award.
The United States Supreme Court later returned to these problems
in Thomas v. Washington Gas Light Co." 9 In a plurality opinion, four
members of the Court "overruled" Magnolia. In a separate opinion, three
justices joined in the result, but on the traditional basis that the state
statute at issue in Thomas failed to contain the "unmistakable language"
that would bar a second recovery.
Shortly after Thomas, the Fifth Circuit reviewed all of this in a con-
troversy involving Texas state law and the LHWCA and decided that
Magnolia had not been overruled; that "unmistakable language" in a state
statute could still be a bar; but that "unmistakable language" was not
present in the Texas statute in question.' 20
It thus appears that in the minds of four justices writing in 1980,
Magnolia should have been overruled. The inference may be drawn from
that position that no language in a state statute would be sufficient to
require a second state to deny a successive remedy under its own statute.
Looming over all of this, especially because it is a state law/LHWCA
interplay, is the Supreme Court's decision four days before Thomas in
Sun Ship, Inc. v. Pennsylvania.'' In Sun Ship, the Court continued its
consistent protection of certain workers covered by the LHWCA by
holding that a state may apply its law to land-based injuries which fall
within the coverage of the LHWCA. In reaching that decision, the Court
offered several revealing statements which may have a bearing on the
Magnolia-McCartin-Thomas problem and the Louisiana amendments.
Without dissent, the court opined that the intent of Congress in amend-
ing the LHWCA was to assure a certain federal standard of benefits in
the face of the paucity of state benefits, and that concurrent jurisdiction
promoted rather than hindered that objective. It noted that workers who
commenced their actions under state law "will generally be able to make
up the difference between state and federal benefit levels by seeking
relief"' 2 under the LHWCA when it is applicable. In an important foot-
note at that juncture, the court stated:
119. 448 U.S. 261 (1980).
120. Landry v. Carlson Mooring Serv., 643 F.2d 1080 (5th Cir. 1981). In Landry, the
employer was held to be entitled to a credit for the amount received by the employee under
the Texas state law settlement. But the amount received was interpreted to be the net amount
after deduction of an attorney fee. Thus, though the employee had settled for $200,000
under state law, he received only $15,000. The employee was required to credit only the
latter amount against an eventual award under the LHWCA.
121. 447 U.S. 715 (1980).
122. Id. at 724.
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Most often, state workmen's compensation laws will not be
treated as making awards thereunder final or conclusive ....
Admittedly, if a particular state compensation law provision does
indisputably declare its awards final, a conflict with the LHWCA
may possibly arise where a claimant seeks inferior state benefits
in the first instance. But the consequences to the claimant of this
error would be less drastic than those of a mistake under the rule
appellant [employer] contemplates-under which a misstep could
result in no benefits. At any rate, although the question is not
directly before us, we observe that if federal preclusion ever need
be implied to cope with this remote contingency, a less disruptive
approach would be to pre-empt the state compensation exclusivity
clause, rather than to preempt the entire state compensation statute
as appellant suggests.' 23
What the court termed "this remote contingency" in Sun Ship was
described in similar terms by the plurality in Thomas.
[I]t was immediately recognized that Magnolia no longer had any
significant practical impact. Moreover, since a state legislature
seldom focuses on the extraterritorial effect of its enactments, and
since a state court has even less occasion to consider whether an
award under its State's law is intended to preclude a supplemen-
tal award under another State's Workmen's Compensation Act,
the probability that any State would thereafter announce a new
rule against supplemental awards in other States was extremely
remote. As a matter of fact, subsequent cases in the state courts
have overwhelmingly followed McCartin and permitted successive
state workmen's compensation awards. 2
4
This "extremely remote" possibility is seemingly the objective of these
Louisiana amendments. The amendments to Louisiana Revised Statutes
23:1225(D) begin by stating that the "filing of a claim or suit" or the
"receipt or acceptance" of benefits under a statute such as the LHWCA
does not preclude entitlement to any benefits under Louisiana state law., 2
Despite that statement, and clearly to provide the "unmistakable language"
barely preserved in Thomas, the following sentence states that payment
of benefits under state law is "irreconcilable"' '2 6 with benefits under a
123. Id. at 724 n.6 (citations omitted).
124. 448 U.S. at 274-75 (footnotes omitted).
125. This is meant to distinguish the initiation of an action, or simple acceptance of
benefits, from a final resolution of the matter. One can expect that the employer will be
given credit for the amounts due under one system but paid under the other, though the
amended statute does not specifically address the issue. The United States Supreme Court
appears to take this for granted. Sun Ship, Inc. v. Pennsylvania, 447 U.S. 715, 725 n.8
(1980); Calbeck v. Travelers Ins. Co., 370 U.S. 114 (1962).
126. Perhaps this word is drawn from the opinion in Newport News Shipbuilding &
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statute such as LHWCA. Thus no benefits shall be payable under state
law once an employee receives "favorable final adjudication, judgment
or settlement" under the LHWCA "regardless of the adequacy thereof." 27
Filing under the LHWCA, however, suspends the prescriptive periods under
state law under section 1209. 28
Apparently, the statement that state benefits are "irreconcilable" with
federal benefits is intended to satisfy the Magnolia-McCartin-Thomas re-
quirement and bar any further recovery under the LHWCA after
"payments of benefits" under state law. And the sentence following pro-
vides legislatively for a bar to any state claims after a final determination
of LHWCA claims. Thus the injured worker is put to a compulsory elec-
tion of remedies.
Given the history of this area of the law, it is unlikely that this amend-
ment will go unchallenged. In light of the ominous comment in the Sun
Ship footnote, the challenge has a good chance for success. Ultimately,
the Supreme Court will probably end up in the only reasonable position:
accord to the worker who has potential remedies under either system the
more favorable remedy, and permit successive remedies to achieve that
level if necessary. Should the worker choose settlement under one system,
he should be required to waive any rights which he has under the other.
If he settles without such a waiver, he should be required to demonstrate
that the "successive" award that he seeks will not take him beyond the
"more favorable" remedy.
REVISION OF PENALTY AND ATTORNEY FEES PROVISIONS
Act 1 made some significant changes in the provisions relating to
penalties and attorney fees. Various specific time periods for certain types
of payments are prescribed by amended Louisiana Revised Statutes
23:1201, and applicable penalties for failing to meet those deadlines are
provided within that same section with new standards for their imposi-
Dry Dock Co. v. Director, 583 F.2d 1273, 1277 (4th Cir. 1978) (prosecution of claim under
state law does not bar LHWCA proceeding if the second proceeding is not "theoretically
irreconcilable" with the first claim), which was itself quoted in Landry. Mere use of the
word may not be sufficient, however. The Newport News opinion elaborated by indicating
that such theoretical irreconcilability would consist of requiring a claimant "to assume a
position inconsistent with that which he took in his initial quest for relief." Id. That would
probably not be required in order for a worker to assert rights under the LHWCA which
he had asserted under a state act.
127. A very narrow interpretation would have the adjective "favorable" modify judg-
ment and settlement as well, suggesting that unless the judgment under the LHWCA is
in the employee's favor, he may seek benefits under the state Act. The addition of the
phrase "regardless of the adequacy thereof" suggests that this is the less plausible meaning.
128. LA. R.S. 23:1225(D) (Supp. 1984). Would it be possible to settle for a designated
amount, "divide" it between state law and the LHWCA and get some kind of binding
final determination under each on that basis.?
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tion. Section 1201.2, which had been the basis for penalties and attorney
fees against non-insured employers, was amended to eliminate any reference
to penalties and to provide the same treatment for attorney fees as to
insurers and non-insured employers alike.
Subsection 1201(B) now provides that the first installment of com-
pensation payable for temporary total disability, permanent total disability,
or death is due on the fourteenth day "after the employer has knowledge
of the injury or death and resulting loss of income." Two significant
changes should be noted. The time period does not begin to run until
the employer has knowledge of the necessary facts. Thus, in an instance
in which an insurer might have knowledge of the facts but.the employer
did not, the period would not have begun to run. In fact, there appears
to be no provision starting the time period for these types of benefits
when only the insurer has knowledge of the necessary facts. But by the
same token, the period begins to run against an insurer once the employer
has knowledge. And secondly, the necessary facts are (a) knowledge of
the injury or death and (b) resulting loss of income. In theory, if the
employer knows of an injury or death but is not made aware of any
resulting loss of income, the fourteen-day period does not commence.
For SEB, subsection 1201(C) provides a fourteen-day period for com-
mencement of such payments, to begin when either the employer or in-
surer has knowledge of the "compensable . . . benefits." Presumably this
is meant to convey the concept that the employer or insurer must have
information tending to demonstrate compensability. For partial disability
benefits (the former schedule losses), there is a thirty-day period for com-
mencement of such payments, to begin when the employer or insurer
''receives a medical report giving notice of the permanent partial
disability."' 9 There is no apparent reason for the different references with
respect to the two groups of payments (knowledge of employer for one
type, knowledge of employer or insurer for the other).
If these time periods are not respected, a twelve percent penalty is
to be added to each unpaid installment unless the causes for excuse from
the penalty are established. These causes are listed in subsection 1201(E):
either as a result of "conditions over which the employer or insurer had
no control" or "[w]henever the employee's right to such benefits has been
reasonably controverted by the employer or his insurer." In the latter
case, the section states simply that the penalties "shall not apply." The
latter exception seems to establish a standard which is more favorable
to the employer than the standard previously delineated in the cases. In-
terpreted in its most extreme fashion, it would permit an employer or
insurer to "reasonably controvert" a claim at any point in the proceedings
and never thereafter incur any penalties. The exception provides "whenever
129. LA. R.S. 23:1201(D) (Supp. 1984).
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the employee's right . . . has been reasonably controverted." 30 So inter-
preted, the standard seems too lenient. An employer or insurer might have
reasonably controverted the claim at an earlier point, but may thereafter
have received additional facts or medical reports which indicate it should
begin payments. Since its "contrary" position is no longer "reasonable,"
the condition for non-imposition of penalties no longer applies. This in-
terpretation would avoid the anomalous result of an employer or insurer
taking a reasonable position on the facts available to it at the time, but
then being protected against any future penalties regardless of further
developments.
Subsection 1201(E) goes on to provide that the penalty, if applicable,
is to be assessed against either the employer or the insurer, "depending
upon who was at fault in causing the delay." And the subsection pro-
hibits an insurer from paying the penalty if it is determined that the
employer was the one who caused the delay.
If a dispute proceeds to judgment, a twenty-four percent penalty is
imposed on the amount of the judgment if a "final, nonappealable judg-
ment is not paid within thirty days after it becomes due."' 3 ' Presumably,
this is simply meant to say that the penalty applies if a final judgment
is not paid within thirty days after it becomes final under the ordinary
rules of civil procedure. The use of both "final" and "nonappealable"
seems to add no additional meaning. There are also exceptions to this
penalty: if "the order is appealed" or if non-payment results from condi-
tions over which the employer (but not the insurer) had no control. This
exception is poorly worded, but presumably means that if a judgment
is appealed, the time period does not begin to run-which is simply another
way of saying that the judgment is not yet final.
Finally, subsection 1201(G) requires that the employer or insurer notify
the director of the commencement, suspension, or modification of any
compensation payments.
Less substantial changes are made to Louisiana Revised Statutes
23:1201.2. As noted earlier, all penalties with reference to untimely
payments are removed and placed in section 1201 as amended. Thus, sec-
tion 1201.2 only concerns attorney fees. The amended section retains the
time period of payment of "any claim due" within sixty days after receipt
of written notice. If the payment is not made within that period, and
the failure to do so is arbitrary, capricious, and without probable cause,
attorney fees may be imposed. Apparently, the previous jurisprudential
standards will continue to be applicable as to the award of attorney fees.
130. Emphasis added.
131. LA. R.S. 23:1201(F) (Supp. 1984).
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However, the net effect of the amendments to the two sections is
to establish different standards for the award of penalties and for the
award of attorney fees. The time periods are different, and penalties might
be awarded in an instance in which an insufficient period of time had
elapsed for an award of attorney fees. The substantive basis for the two
awards differs. An insurer or employer could "reasonably controvert"
a claim and escape penalties. But if the narrow construction mentioned
earlier is chosen and the insurer or employer did not change its position
upon changed facts at a later point, it could find itself tagged with attorney
fees for arbitrary and capricious behavior.
Insurers are now specifically included in section 1201.2, and any ap-
plication of Louisiana Revised Statutes 22:658 is prohibited.
REHABILITATION
Following the 1983 amendments to the Act, Louisiana for the first
time has a mandatory rehabilitation provision. 3 ' It is very closely pat-
terned on a portion of the Florida workers' compensation statute.' 33 In
fact, it is an almost verbatim adoption of the Florida statute with a few
changes which appear to be primarily in the employer's interest.
Louisiana Revised Statutes 23:1226(A) provides that when an employee
has suffered a compensable injury which precludes' 3' him from earning
wages "equal to wages earned" before the injury, he is entitled to "prompt
rehabilitation services." This standard is not the same as the threshold
for SEB. An injured worker who is able to earn ninety percent or more
of his former wage is not entitled to SEB'35 but under this language would
be entitled to rehabilitation services if needed.
The same subsection requires the employer or insurer to provide
suitable training and education, which "may" be state or federal pro-
grams "when conveniently available" or "may" be public or private agen-
cies "cooperating" with the state or federal agencies. And "in the absence
of such programs," the employer or insurer is required to provide
rehabilitation with available private agencies. Government agencies are
clearly preferred, if not in fact mandated to be used first. There is an
interesting difference between this provision and the Florida source pro-
vision. The Florida statute specifically requires that these rehabilitation
services be provided by the employer or insurer "at its own expense"
132. LA. R.S. 23:1226 (Supp. 1984).
133. FLA. STAT. ANN. § 440.49 (West 1981).
134. The Florida source provision says when "it appears that the injury will preclude"
the employee from earning his prior wage. FLA. STAT. ANN. § 440.49(l)(a) (West 1981).
135. LA. R.S. 23:1221(3) (Supp. 1984).
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and contains no preference for governmental agencies. In fact, the Florida
statute says simply that the employer or insurer "may cooperate" with
such agencies as well as public or private non-governmental agencies.
These deletions raise some intriguing questions. Is there an inference
that if rehabilitation services are available through governmental agen-
cies, the cost should be borne by the general taxpayers and not by the
employer or insurer? The absence of the phrase "at its own expense"
could be so interpreted, in light of the mandate that governmental agen-
cies be used. Does anyone know whether these governmental agencies are
sufficiently staffed to provide such services? And if the governmental en-
tities decided that a charge should be made for that service, is there any
authority to impose such a charge? Could the director establish by rule
some kind of fund for rehabilitation services rendered to be maintained
by uniform assessments? This solution would unfairly penalize the
employers who are careful and do not often have to utilize the services.
If this provision is an attempt to cast the rehabilitation costs on the
public fisc and the taxpayers rather than the employer or insurer in ques-
tion, it is unwise. It does nothing to assign the cost of workplace injuries
to the proper party, and does little if anything to encourage safety and
discourage carelessness. Hopefully, some method will be devised to
calculate the fair cost of such services, if provided by a governmental
agency, and to assign that cost to the employer or insurer.
Louisiana Revised Statutes 23:1226(B) provides a definition of the
"suitable gainful employment" at which the rehabilitation program is
directed. It means "employment or self-employment, after rehabilitation,
which is reasonably attainable and which offers an opportunity to restore
the individual as soon as practical and nearly as possible to his average
earnings at the time of the injury." Again, there is a curious omission
from the Florida statutory provision. Following the phrase "reasonably
attainable," the Florida law continues "in light of the individual's age,
education, previous occupation and injury." The legal result of that dele-
tion is unclear. Arguably, it could mean that the employer or insurer is
only required to pay for rehabilitation which will offer "an opportunity"
to restore a person to his former wage in any employment which is
"reasonably attainable," regardless of whether a person's age or educa-
tion might indicate that such a job is not attainable as a practical matter.
If that interpretation is chosen, the worker might find himself
"rehabilitated" but not able to support himself. The full Florida provi-
sion seems preferable, as it affords some flexibility in the standard of
"reasonably attainable" employment.
If the required rehabilitation services are not voluntarily offered or
accepted, the director may refer the employee to a qualified physician
to evaluate the practicality and need for rehabilitation services. Upon
receipt of that evaluation, the director may then recommend that service
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or another deemed necessary."3 6 And here it is specifically provided that
this service will be at the expense of the employer or insurer, an indica-
tion that the earlier omission was not unintentional.
Under Louisiana Revised Statutes 23:1226(E) the mandatory rehabilita-
tion period is twenty-six weeks, which can be extended for another twenty-
six weeks upon a showing to the director that the extension is "necessary
and proper," or, if he disagrees, to the court. Voluntary continuation
of rehabilitation by the employer or insurer is permitted. 3 ' These provi-
sions are identical to those of the Florida statute. However, subsection
1226(E) adds to the Florida statute by requiring an injured employee to
request and begin rehabilitation within two years of termination of tem-
porary total disability.
The same section requires the employer or insurer to bear the cost
of board, lodging, and travel if the rehabilitation service is located away
from the employee's customary residence. But such services are required
to be performed "within the state" when such facilities are available, thus
imposing some limitation on this responsibility.
Finally, subsection 1226(E), like the Florida provision, imposes a
penalty for refusal to accept rehabilitation deemed necessary by the direc-
tor or the court of a fifty percent reduction in weekly compensation
benefits for each week of the refusal. No sanction is placed upon the
employer who does not tender rehabilitation services or resists requests
for them.
An employee who is undergoing rehabilitation is entitled to temporary
total disability benefits during that period, and any determination as to
the permanency of his total disability is suspended while he is in the
program.3 8 Louisiana Revised Statutes 23:1226(D) provides specifically
that prior to a recommendation of the director or adjudication of a court
that the worker is permanently and totally disabled, an evaluation of
rehabilitation potential must be made.
On balance, this new section is a step in the right direction and has
justifiably been cited by the employer community as an important benefit
accorded to the worker in the 1983 amendments. However, the curious
deletions from, and additions to, the Florida source provisions suggest
some tinkering with the provision to temper its pro-worker slant. For the
most part, these changes seem unnecessary and unwise and could cast
doubt on the depth of the commitment of the employer community to
rehabilitation.
136. LA. R.S. 23:1226(C) (Supp. 1984).
137. If the rehabilitation program should take longer than a total of 52 weeks (and
some apparently do), there is no mandatory coverage of that cost by the employer.
138. LA. R.S. 23:1226(F)-(G) (Supp. 1984).
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CHANGES IN DEFENSES
Defense of Statutory Violation Abolished
Act 1 deleted from section 1081 the defense of deliberate violation
of statutory regulations affecting life and limb.' 39 No doubt this deletion
is a reflection of the paucity of instances in which the defense was used,
and of the argument that in most such instances, a violation would only
be ordinary negligence and would not be a bar to recovery of benefits."'
Aggressor Defense Partially Codified
The aggressor defense which had grown up under the "intent to in-
jure" defense was at least partially codified by Act 1. As amended, Loui-
siana Revised Statutes 23:1081(1)(d) now provides that compensation is
to be denied for an injury caused "to the initial physical aggressor in
an unprovoked physical altercation, unless excessive force was used in
retaliation against the initial aggressor."
In some instances, this will be nothing more than legislative recogni-
tion of the jurisprudential defense. One may suspect that the denial of
benefits in cases such as St. Pierre v. Baifield Industries'' and Armstrong
v. Jefferson Disposal Co.' 2 will continue under this statutory standard.
In each instance, the claimant attempted or achieved the first blow follow-
ing a verbal dispute; in St. Pierre the claimant followed his superior out
of a meeting to attempt the first blow.
But some uncertainty is introduced by the concept that the defense
is limited to the initial physical aggressor in an "unprovoked" physical
altercation. Certainly, if there is no provocation and the claimant takes
out physically after someone and ends up being injured, the defense
applies. But what if the provocation to which he responds is verbal in
nature: he is called a son-of-a-bitch and responds with physical aggres-
sion? On the one hand, it may be plausibly argued that this is not an
"unprovoked" physical altercation. It was provoked by a verbal insult.
Thus, one might conclude that compensation should not be denied. On
139. LA. R.S. 23:1081, as amended by Act 1, now contains as subsection (1)(d) a defense
based upon the claimant's being the initial physical aggressor rather than the breach of
statutory regulations defense.
140. See W. MALONE & A. JOHNSON, supra note 2, § 342.
141. 225 So. 2d 96 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1969) (claimant followed superior out of meeting,
hurling verbal insults, and was in process of throwing a punch at him when superior hit
him first; compensation denied).
142. 258 So. 2d 213 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1972) (after lengthy verbal dispute, claimant
slashed at fellow worker with a knife, but never hit him; claimant was then shot in struggle
which ensued after fellow worker drew a gun; compensation denied). See also Augustine
v. Washington Parish Police Jury, 383 So. 2d 1271 (La. App. 1st Cir.), cert. denied, 386
So. 2d 1379 (La. 1980).
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the other hand, it may be noted that this interpretation might be incon-
sistent with some of the cases. In Garner v. Avondale Marine Ways,
Inc.,' 3 the dispute began with insults. The claimant hit the fellow worker
in response to the insults, but then got the worst of the struggle and was
injured. Compensation was denied. Would such a claimant now be entitled
to benefits because his initial physical aggression was "provoked" rather
than "unprovoked"?
If the claimant is the "initial" physical aggressor, then by definition
there must be either no provocation on the other side or only verbal pro-
vocation. If the other disputant is guilty of physical provocation, then
the claimant could no longer be the "initial" physical aggressor, and thus
would not be denied benefits.
If that is the meaning of the amendment, then the most sensible
approach is the one actually approved in the more recent decisions. If
the claimant goes out of his way to initiate physical aggression in response
to verbal provocation only or no provocation at all, then compensation
may properly be denied. But if the facts indicate an escalating war of
insults and then blows in which both claimant and fellow worker appear
equally eager to enter the fray, it is probably unfair to deny compensa-
tion simply because the claimant happened to be the first one to step
over the line. Disagreements, both verbal and physical, are a part of the
work place."' Perhaps the court in such an instance could simply say
that the claimant was not an "aggressor" in the common-sense meaning
of that term but rather a mutual combatant.
There is understandable protection in the amendment even for the
initial physical aggressor when his aggression is met with excessive force
in retaliation. Even the fact that the claimant may have sought out a
fellow worker who is not equally eager for the fray without any provoca-
tion whatsoever does not give that worker a privilege to do any more
than defend himself to the extent reasonably necessary. '
CONCLUSION
With the exception of a few relatively minor changes elsewhere in
the Act,'"6 the foregoing discussion summarizes and comments upon the
143. 134 So. 2d 703 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1961).
144. Attaway v. Farley's Glass Co., 430 So. 2d 705 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1983) (law prior
to amendment; no denial of recovery).
145. In this regard, consider the rejection of the defense in Johnson v. East Baton Rouge
City Parish Gov't, 408 So. 2d 1151 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1981) ("out of frustration," a worker
threw a bottle at another, who responded with a fatal shot).
146. The amendments adjust slightly the reimbursement amounts for employers under
the Second Injury Fund. Although technically flawed in drafting, LA. R.S. 23:1378(A)(1)
is probably intended to grant to an eligible employer a reimbursement of 60076 of supplemental
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important changes wrought by Act 1 of the 1983 Extraordinary Session.
The faithful reader who has persevered to this point will come away with
the impression that the writer has been more than mildly critical of the
1983 amendments. There are certainly sections of the Act which have been
benefitted by the amendments; the provisions on rehabilitation come im-
mediately to mind. There is at least the potential in the administrative
dispute resolution process for a decrease in litigation, a tempering of the
adversarial nature of the present scheme, and some continuous supervi-
sion of the entire system.
But on balance, the amendments place the Act in an extreme posi-
tion, too far removed from the great middleground which should be the
foundation of legislation such as this. The current situation can only invite
retribution from the employees' side, at whatever propitious moment may
present itself. That is simply not a good posture for this problem to be
in, though one must candidly admit that it is a traditional posture. The
history of Louisiana workers' compensation is one of substantial conflict
between employers (arguably a more conservative posture) and the judiciary
siding with employees (arguably a more liberal or progressive posture).
One has the feeling that the judiciary's reaction has been in response to
the legislative position, rather than arising out of some sort of longstand-
ing commitment to the employee's side of the debate.
Past experience indicates that a conservative legislative posture
ultimately results in a judicial reaction. One need only recall the early
conservative provisions from 1914 until 1930 and the devastating judicial
earnings benefits or permanent partial benefits paid to an employee whose previous disabili-
ty merges with a compensable disability entitling him to those benefits. There is no substan-
tive change in LA. R.S. 23:1378(A)(2), calling for reimbursement for all benefits after 104
weeks, except that it is now limited to cases resulting in permanent total disabilty. Due
to the amendments to the substantive requirement for permanent total disability, such cases
are likely to be rare. There is a rewording of LA. R.S. 23:1378(A)(3) without apparent
substantive change, entitling the employer to reimbursement for death benefits after the
first 175 weeks of payment. And, for the first time, there is authority for reimbursement
of medical expenses at the rate of 50% of the first $10,000 so paid and 100% of all sums
for medical expenses over that amount.
Amendments to LA. R.S. 23:1202 codify the results of several decisions and academic
suggestion to provide specifically that the statutory minimum is not applicable to supplemental
earnings benefits and permanent partial disability awards (former schedule losses). See Istre
v. Hudson Eng'g Corp., 386 So. 2d 366 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 392 So.
2d 1067 (La. 1981); Hollis v. Travelers Ins. Co., 368 So. 2d 154 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1978);
W. MALONE & A. JOHNSON, supra note 2, § 278.
Finally, LA. R.S. 23:1206 was amended to add "or unearned wages paid" to voluntary
payments as amounts for which the employer is entitled to credit against compensation due.
The amendment also deleted the final proviso which specified that the credit had to be
taken by shortening the number of weeks rather than by reducing the amount of each periodic
payment.
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reaction in Knispel v. Gulf States Utilities Co.'4 7 Perhaps the drafters of
the present amendments believe that this time they have finally drawn
the Act so tightly that no judicial reaction is possible. It may be so, but
one is reminded of the ominous warning of the philosopher Santayana
that "those who cannot remember the past are condemned to repeat it.""1 8
Should history repeat itself in this instance, Hobbes' observation about
life in general will be applicable to the life of the 1983 amendments.
147. 174 La. 401, 141 So. 9 (1932).
148. I G. SANTAYANA, THE LIFE OF REASON (1905).

